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ABSTRACT 
 
The past three decades have been described by some authors as a golden era of public sector 
reforms, particularly, in developed countries. In a context of changing public expectations, 
financial and economic crises and technological advancements many governments across the 
world have pursued reforms to improve efficiency and achieve greater effectiveness in 
governance, as well as to address persistent problems such as corruption, among many 
motives. 
 
This study sought to examine Botswana’s most recent attempts at public sector reform, 
which, to a greater extent than its previous endeavours have reflected global trends. 
Specifically, it sought to evaluate the impact of performance management, privatization and 
anti-corruption reforms on the country’s public sector. The dissertation has primarily 
consisted of desktop documentary review of relevant literature and provides an extensive 
assessment of public sector reforms trends in developed and developing countries, as the 
background against which examination of the three reform initiatives undertaken by Botswana 
is made. 
 
The study found that performance management, privatization and anti-corruption reforms 
have all had disparate effects on Botswana’s public sector. Overall, privatization provides the 
least cause for optimism, having failed to match the rhetoric of its founding policy. The study 
maintains that the highly bureaucratic and centralized nature of the country’s administrative 
machinery has been a barrier to the development of the private sector in the country. The 
Performance Management System and the Directorate of Economic Crime and Corruption 
(DCEC) were, by comparison, found to be relatively more successful reforms, with the latter 
found  to  have  p l a ye d  an  impor t an t  role in sustaining the country’s consistently high 
ranking in global governance rankings. The study concludes that while these reforms have 
generally been positive developments, there is a need for a review of Botswana’s privatization 
policy if the country is to address what, by common consent, are regarded as its main 
economic concerns, such as private sector underdevelopment and mineral resource 
dependency.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This dissertation is the culmination of a study that sought to investigate the implementation 
and impact of public sector reforms undertaken in Botswana. Three specific measures were 
under examination, namely performance management, privatization and anti-corruption 
reforms. Together, these initiatives comprise the key components of the most recent 
reforms to the country’s public sector, the genesis of which was the last decade of the 
twentieth century. 
 
1.1 Public Sector Reforms 
In the evolution of public administration and management the period since the late 1970s is 
commonly regarded as one of considerable dynamism, as highlighted by the concerted efforts 
of governments in developed and developing countries at transforming their public sectors. 
Prominent narratives in the scholarly discourse of this era identify as among its underlying 
themes, the improvement of performance in the public sector, particularly in its role as a 
conduit for public services. In their pursuit of this amongst other objectives, pioneer reformer 
nations embarked on extensive changes that to a significant extent reflected the political, 
economic and social milieus within which they occurred. 
 
Much of the literature charting public sector developments in the 20th  century identifies a 
‘traditional’ approach to public administration that, until the p e r i o d  o f  administrative 
changes of its latter decades, had been the established theoretical and practical discipline in 
many governments  around  the  world.  According  to  Pollitt  and  Bouckaert  (2004:24),  
various forces accounted for the “more or less simultaneous” reform movements that 
subsequently arose to challenge this perspective, initially in Western developed industrial 
nations and then beyond it. There were economic imperatives, necessitated by the oil price-
induced economic r e c e s s i o n . These i n c l u d e d  r i s i n g  f i s c a l  d e b t s  a n d  t h e  
r a p i d  g r o w t h  of international trade and global capital markets. Equally significant were 
socio-demographic developments, highlighted by, for example, changing demands for and 
expectations of state- provided services; and changes to political systems, some important 
drivers of which included the embrace of generic management ideas in public sector 
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operations and the prevailing climate of public dissatisfaction with public services (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004:26-37). 
 
The  ensuing  changes  of  this  period  marked  a  departure  from  what  was considered 
the orthodox framework for public sector thinking and organization. Their implications for the 
role, size and scope of government and the established bureaucratic mode of administration in 
particular, were austere. As, according to the dominant discourse of the day, the  convenient  
culprit  for  many  of  the preceding crises, the latter was regarded variously as wasteful, 
unaccountable, unresponsive and ultimately underperforming (Bangura and Larbi, 2006:3-7). 
Seized upon by new administrations that were antagonistic to the prevailing order, notable 
among these being the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom from the 
late 1970s, these charges were presented as symptomatic of the existential crisis of the 
welfare state. They were to be remedied, according to the rhetoric of these early reformers, 
by radical alterations that included: 
 
•   the restructuring and reduction of the public sector; 
•   the reorganization and slimming down of central civil services; 
• the introduction of competition into remaining public services, especially  
through internal  markets,  and  the  contracting  of  public  service  
provision  to  the  private sector; 
•   the  pursuit  of  ‘value for  money’  through  performance  management  and
 auditing (McCourt and Minogue, 2001:21). 
 
The  above  are  key  prescriptions  of  the  broad  reform  agenda  that  many  governments 
embraced  to  treat  the perceived  symptoms  of  public  sector  underperformance.  
Collectively termed New Public Management (NPM), these reforms emanated from 
Commonwealth countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia and 
spread to member states of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).1  Primarily under the auspices of international organizations and donor 
institutions, NPM-associated ideas  and  practices  gained  in  subsequent  decades  an  
international  dimension,  often disseminated  to  developing  and  transition  countries  as  
                                                          
1 OECD member states are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
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examples  of  international ‘best practice’. Evidence of this is borne by their presence in 
numerous countries of different cultural and political traditions (United Nations, 2005: 10). 
While NPM has by no means comprised the sole agenda for public sector reform since the 
late 1970s, as confirmed by emergent reform trends t h a t  h a v e  e m p h a s i z e d , a m o n g  
o t h e r s , g o v e r n a n c e  and c a p a c i t y  building, its implications for the role and character 
of the state have been more extensive than those of recent reform agendas. 
 
Developing and transitional countries have also undertaken public sector reform programmes 
in recent decades. While subject to similar motivations for transformation to more 
industrialised countries, including performance imperatives, initial reforms in developing 
countries were largely aimed at arresting prevailing macro-economic crises. Comprising 
measures such as trade liberalization and privatization, these early reforms were among the 
‘loan conditionalities’ appended to the Structural Adjustment Programs of the international 
donor community (Balogun and Mutahaba, 1989; Bangura and Larbi, 1996). Wider 
administrative reforms, which sought to address issues of state governance and development,  
only  became  central  to  the  public  sector  reform  agendas  of  developing countries in the 
1990s. 
 
1.2 Background to Public Sector Reform in Botswana 
As with most countries, Botswana has not been immune to the appeal of reform as a means 
of addressing its public sector challenges. Unlike its developing counterparts and for reasons 
that will be explored in some detail in the following chapters, however, the pressures for 
public sector transformation have generally been endogenous, affording the country a home 
grown approach to reform. Since its independence in 1966, Botswana has undertaken a host of 
reforms that can broadly be categorized into two phases. The first phase was introduced a few 
years after independence for the purposes of guiding and “sustain[ing] the management of the 
meagre resources at its disposal” (Bashe and Jongman, 2006:19). These reforms included: 
 
 National Development Planning – the six yearly agenda that details the 
policies, programmes and projects to be implemented by government 
 Manpower and Financial Ceilings – which were intended to manage the 
growth of public service personnel and control the use of funds by 
Ministries and Departments 
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 Localisation – which facilitated the development of an indigenous corps 
of public service officials 
 Job Evaluation - this provided a way of managing and rewarding 
performance in the public service (Bashe and Jongman, 2006:19). 
 
Although useful for introducing systems and methods to the early post-colonial 
administrations, the initial reforms were fragmented in their implementation, with their scope 
limited to specific areas of the public service rather than the system as whole. Equally 
important was the insufficient attention given to the assessment of performance and public 
service delivery (Corkery et al., 1998; Bashe and Jongman, 2006). Lacking the operational 
tools to adequately appraise its management and performance, Botswana’s public sector was 
riddled with inefficiency and underperformance that manifested in planni g problems such as 
the frequent non-completion of many projects, inefficient management of resources and 
widespread perceptions of insensitivity by the public that it was intended to serve (Republic 
of Botswana, 2002: 3). 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, a second generation of reforms was undertaken with the intention of 
addressing the residual challenges from the previous initiatives and ultimately improving the 
provision and quality of public services. Of the various measures undertaken in that decade, 
performance management systems, privatization and anti-corruption reforms have been 
important for advancing the government’s aims. 
 
1.3 Defining Privatization, Performance Management and Anti-Corruption 
Reforms 
This section will provide general definitions of the three public sector reforms under 
examination in the dissertation: performance management, privatization and anti-corruption 
reforms. 
 
1.3.1 Privatization 
Along with downsizing or retrenchment, privatization has been a common reform measure 
pursued  by  industrial  and  developing  countries  alike  and  the  previous  three  decades 
have witnessed privatizations across all spheres of the state including national airlines, 
telecommunications and health services (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005). Though frequently 
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taken to imply the complete divestiture of state assets to private ownership, in practice 
privatization can take a broad range of forms with different degrees of state and private 
ownership. Hope and Chikulo (2000: 32) classify privatization as one of various types of 
decentralization and define it as “the transfer of operational control and responsibility for 
government functions and services to the private sector – private voluntary organization or 
private enterprises.” The various forms it can assume include: the contracting out of 
government services to external agencies; joint ventures between government and private 
entities; and, the sale of government services or functions. In many countries, obligations to 
transfer state assets, whether partially or completely to private and voluntary sector control, 
have often been driven by the imperatives of budgetary constraints, reducing subsidies to 
state owned enterprises and strengthening private sector participation in the economy. 
According to the economic justifications for privatization, state divestiture of public 
enterprises exposes them to competition and the discipline of market forces, reduces public 
expenditure and enables governments to direct their efforts and scarce resources to other, 
more critical policy concerns (McCourt and Minogue, 2001; Hughes, 2003). 
 
1.3.2 Performance Management 
An enduring legacy of the flurry of administrative transformations of the late 1970s onwards 
has been the growing scrutiny of the performances of public organizations and the public 
servants in their employ. Although public sector performance and particularly its 
measurement  has  long  been  a  concern  for  practitioners  and  policy  makers,  with  early 
innovations dating back to the 19th  century, the measures that existed were largely “ad hoc 
and far from systematic” (Hughes, 2003:157). Under the traditional model of administration, 
which had as its basis the concept of rational-legal authority, the notion of performance 
incorporated the fulfilment of the inherently political values that the model was intended to 
realise, including legal, budgetary and professional accountability. ‘Post-bureaucratic’ 
perspectives of performance, however, have been markedly different. These have a more 
practical and output-centred conception of performance, which is to be determined by 
amongst other requirements, the establishment of clear standards and measures (Hood, 1991; 
Rouse, 1999; Hughes, 2003; OECD, 2004). 
 
The abovementioned constitute some features of a performance management framework. 
One definition of performance management is provided by Armstrong (2000: 1), who 
conceives of it as: 
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“a strategic and integrated process that delivers sustained success to organizations by improving the 
performance  of  the  people  who  work  in  them  and  by  developing  the  capabilities  of  individual 
contributors and teams.” 
 
Drawing from advances in information technologies and private sector techniques, 
performance management has been closely associated with NPM. Among leading reformers, 
it has involved the development by public agencies of ‘measurable’ organizational and 
individual performance indicators and their consistent monitoring, measurement and reporting 
(Hughes, 2003; Ohemeng, 2009). Assessed against predefined objectives, the resultant 
performance information would then form the basis of decisions such as resource allocations, 
rewards and sanctions (Hood, 1991; OECD, 2004). The establishment of performance 
management frameworks has been widespread, having been applied to many sectors such as 
those of education and health by governments seeking to understand and improve the 
performances of personnel and organizations to predefined objectives. 
 
1.3.3 Anti-Corruption Reforms 
Since the early 1990s the scourge of corruption in the public sector and the importance of 
effective measures to counter it have gained prominence in the policy agendas of many 
governments. These developments have been notably pronounced in developing and 
transition countries, for which the availability of donor aid created opportunities for 
corruption. The introduction of anti-corruption programmes in these countries was 
subsequently made a conditionality of future aid by donor agencies. According to the 
Independent Evaluation Group’s2 (IEG) assessment of the World Bank’s support, titled 
Public Sector Reform: What Works and Why? (2008), several factors contributed to the 
broadening of the Bank’s interventions to include a ‘ governance agenda’. Prominent among 
these were the need for second-generation reforms to institutions and the general failures of 
lending, particularly in Africa (IEG, 2008: 15). 
 
Corruption is defined by the World Bank in its World Development Report of 1997 as “the 
abuse of public power for private gain” (1997:102). In their endeavours to reduce corruption 
                                                          
2 The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) is an independent unit of the World Bank Group. It is responsible for 
evaluating the activities of the Bank, amongst other duties, in order to provide objective assessments of the Bank‟s 
interventions and the lessons learned from experience. 
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many developing and transition governments have adopted multi-pronged strategies that have 
included reforms to economic policy, including the streamlining of rules and improvements to 
transparency; administrative and civil service reforms, including decentralization and changes 
to pay and employment policies; and the strengthening of public oversight and accountability 
mechanisms, which has involved the establishment of public watchdog organizations  with 
varying degrees of autonomy, such as anti-corruption commissions and Ombudsmen 
(World Bank, 1997: 2000). 
 
1.4 Research Approach and Objectives 
The objectives of this study were to examine and evaluate the second generation of public 
sector reforms in Botswana. Specifically, it sought to: 
 
• identify the reasons behind public sector reform in Botswana 
• establish how performance management systems, privatization and anti-
corruption reforms have been implemented in the public sector; and 
• evaluate the impact of these reforms according to the changes they sought to 
effect on Botswana’s public service. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
The study consisted principally of a review of the literature pertinent to public sector reforms 
and relied upon both primary and secondary sources. Important primary sources of literature 
included government publications such as the PMS Philosophy Document, the Privatization 
Policy of 2000 and the Vision 2016 strategy document. Secondary sources of literature used 
included books, journals articles, published and unpublished papers, conference proceedings 
and survey results. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Paper 
 
• CHAPTER ONE provides an introduction and background to the 
major themes explored in the study. It also delineates how the study has 
been undertaken. 
 
• CHAPTER TWO provides a review of the literature from which the 
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study is drawn, as well as an exploration of the theoretical foundations of 
the New Public Management: the body of managerial thought that arose to 
challenge the public administration framework in the 1980s and retains 
some influence in the public sector reforms of many countries. 
 
• CHAPTER  THREE  provides  an  overview  of  the  environment  for  
the  second generation of public sector reforms in Botswana and 
introduces the three reforms under evaluation in the fourth chapter. 
 
• CHAPTER FOUR presents the findings of the three reform initiatives 
implemented in Botswana’s public sector as well as assessments of their 
impacts on the changes they sought to effect. 
 
• CHAPTER FIVE presents the conclusions of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
13  
CHAPTER TWO 
Public Sector Reforms in Developed and Developing Countries 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review existing work in the field of public sector reform 
and the administrative frameworks that influenced many of the reform trends of the latter 
decades of the 20th century. To achieve this objective, the review will first outline what 
comprises the public sector, and its reform thereof. This will be followed by an exploration of 
the  theoretical  foundations  of  the  New  Public  Management  framework  and  subsequent 
reform  trends.  Lastly,  the  review  will  scrutinize  the  literature  on  the  major  reform 
initiatives  in  developed  and  developing  countries  over  the  last  three  decades.  The 
examination of critical writings on public sector reforms should provide a broad context 
within which the introduction of Botswana’s reforms environment can be made. 
 
2.1 The Public Sector 
There is a lack of definitional clarity on the public sector; with attributes such as its role, size 
and scope subject to enduring contention. This state has been aided by the significant 
transformations of the past three decades in which these features, along with other aspects of 
the state, have been redefined by ideological currents in many reforming nations. A suitable 
place from which to begin is a brief examination of the purpose of public sector activity. 
Conventional accounts delineate two primary means by which citizens are able to attain 
goods and services in a society: the market mechanism of private initiative and voluntary 
exchange; and the state, which involves authority and coercion (Lane, 1985; Ostrom, 1990; 
Hughes, 2003). 
 
A concern that arises in a scenario where the market is the sole social choice mechanism is a 
problem of collective action, which Hardin (1968) describes as the inability of individuals to 
choose socially optimal outcomes. While an exhaustive account of the collective action 
problem is beyond the scope of this review, it is important to note that if left to the market 
mechanism, certain socially desired goods and services - such as a legal framework or a 
national defence force - would likely be limited in their provision or entirely absent. This is 
due to two defining characteristics: their equal availability and accessibility to all. These 
render the private costs incurred in their provision greater than their benefits. The prospect of 
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this scenario leads Hughes (2003) and Lane (1985) to observe that failure of the market to 
effectively allocate collectively desired services provides a justification for public policies 
and the entities through which they are realized. Kettl (1997:459) frames this more succinctly 
with the observation that “government exists, and has always existed, precisely because the 
private market, and market-style management, does a terrible job in pursuing goals such as 
these that go beyond efficiency”. 
 
Ayee (2008: 3) posits an institutional definition the public sector, locating as falling within its 
parameters, those entities with the “ability to invoke, to a greater or lesser degree, the 
compulsive power  o f  the  s t a t e .”  His t ypo l og y ident i f ies  t h ree  t ypes  o f  pub l ic  
s ec to r  institutions to whom authority is conferred to varying levels by the state. The first 
group includes bodies such as ministries, departments and agencies that are typically 
associated with government and wield considerable authority. A second group comprises state 
enterprises; their distinguishing features being limited jurisdictions and monopoly statuses, 
such as utility corporations. The third type of entity that receives government mandate, but 
markedly with less authority than others, includes professional regulatory bodies, whose 
primary function is to safeguard public interest. 
 
2.2 The Imperatives for Reform 
The literature reviewed is unanimous in declaring the period since the late 1970s and early 
1980s a golden age for public sector reforms in Western nations (Kickert, 1995; Horton and 
Farnham, 1999; Hughes, 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Adamolekun, 2005; United 
Nations, 2005). This does not imply an era of administrative stasis prior to this period. 
Denhardt and Denhardt (2000:552), in fact, observe “a rich and vibrant evolution in thought 
and in practice” of public administration in the last 100 years. Particularly distinctive about 
the 1980s reforms, however, was that they coalesced around a broad transformation agenda 
with ‘radical’ proposals for better public service delivery. Equally significant has been their 
apparent ubiquity; their associated ideas and practices reportedly finding appeal in such 
culturally   and   politically   diverse   countries   as   Brazil,   South   Korea   and   Australia 
(Mascarenhas, 1993; Kaboolian, 1998; United Nations, 2005). 
 
Kickert (1996) identifies financial and economic pressures as the initial imperatives for 
reform. The economic recession that ensued from the oil crisis of the 1970s left many 
Western nations with severe budget deficits. An obvious target for austerity measures was the 
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public sector, which, in the post war period had undergone significant expansion to meet the 
welfare requirements of citizens. He (1996:2) states that: 
 
“the Western welfare state proved unaffordable. The need to cut back in the public sector, and especially 
the enormous size of the inevitable retrenchments, form the major explanation for the necessity of drastic 
reforms in the structure and functioning of Western governments and administrations. Without drastic 
reforms, these Draconian budget cuts could not be realised.” 
 
In their model of public management reform Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000:25) also refer to 
economic’ forces for reform, albeit within a broader context of ‘socio-economic forces’, 
which also include socio-demographic change and socio-economic policies. They are, 
however, cautious not to ascribe undue explanatory power to arguments that suggest linearity 
between the global economic crises of the 1970’s and the wave of public sector 
transformations ensued. As demonstrated by the wide variations in the timing, manner and 
degrees to which the reforms have manifested in different countries, the influence of global 
economic forces on institutional changes have not been uniform. They suggest that rather 
than being the determining influence in the global reform movement, economic pressures 
provided an indirect influence that subsequently found traction in ‘more intervening factors’ 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000:28). 
 
Mascarenhas (1993) identifies as among the factors behind the public transformations of the 
1980s, the growth in economic interdependence among national economies. In response to 
declining performances brought about by the economic crises, private sector organizations 
and multi-national companies were compelled to restructure and rationalize their operations 
to remain competitive at both national and international levels. According to Mascarenhas 
(1993:320),   the   incongruence   of   growing   global   economic   interconnectedness   and 
government policies that were still relatively confined to national boundaries highlighted the 
necessity of policies promoting national competitiveness. These changes in global economic 
and political dynamics forced change upon the state, firstly through financial deregulation 
and economic liberalization, and then subsequently through public sector transformations. 
 
Socio-demographic  factors  are  also  identified  as  having  given  impetus  to  government 
reforms.  Pollitt  and  Bouckaert  (2000:28)  describe  these  as  “the  pressures  arising  from 
changes in the pattern of life for millions of citizens,” such as “increased life expectancy, 
changes in the patterns of family life (especially a higher incidence of single-parent and 
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single-person households) and considerable rise in the average level of employment.” Some 
of these social changes, particularly within developed nations, drove new and more 
sophisticated expectations of government from citizens (Cohn, 1997; Manning, 2001). In his 
seminal analysis of this era of change, Hood (1991:189) attributes these developments to “the 
set of special social conditions developing in the long peace in the developed countries since 
World War II, and the unique period of economic growth, which accompanied it”. Included 
among these was the emergence of more socially heterogeneous populations, less accepting 
of uniformity in the administration of public services. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Perspective: The Concept of New Public Management 
The term ‘new public management’ (hereafter NPM) was a relatively late entrant to the 
lexicon of public administration in the 1980s, preceded by the extensive administrative 
practices and ideas later subsumed under its label. Hood (1991), for example, links the rise of 
NPM to the prevalence of other ‘administrative megatrends’ including developments in 
generic perspectives of public management. That these reform initiatives emerged before 
collective appellation renders a precise definition of NPM elusive. This is also due to its 
hybrid nature, which is a composite of disparate theories, ideas and techniques. Ferlie et al., 
(2002:213), for example, recognize four models of NPM that, though distinct from traditional 
administration, “contain important differences and distinctive features.” These are the 
efficiency drive, downsizing and decentralization, excellence and the public service 
orientation models. Hood’s (1991:187) widely cited account, on the other hand, identifies as 
key doctrinal components of NPM: hands-on professional management in the public sector; 
explicit standards and measures of performance; greater competition in the public sector; and, 
the use of private sector management styles. 
 
2.3.1 The Origins of NPM and Underlying Forces 
The theoretical girders of NPM can be linked to the sustained attacks on government and the 
bureaucratic mode of delivery in the early 1980s. Cohn (1997) suggests that a crucial factor 
behind these criticisms was the political manipulation of the foregoing socio-economic crises 
in developed nations as evidence of the failings of the welfare state. Central to this was the 
emergence of political actors whose critiques of government, among which were charges of 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency, carried ideological undertones synonymous with New Right 
thinking (Cohn, 1997; Hood, 2003). Two prominent and influential exponents of New Right 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
17  
rhetoric were Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, and Ronald Reagan in the United 
States. 
 
Horton and Farnham (2000) identify the foundation of New Right thinking as the mistrust of 
the central coordination of economic decisions by the state. The movement espouses values 
such as individualism, personal freedom and choice, which are expressed in the preference 
of‘free’  markets over politics, “both as  a means  of producing and distributing goods  
and services in society and as institutional arrangements for providing social organization and 
social control” (2000:10). An important component in the intellectual arsenal used in the New 
Right’s assault on the public sector has been Public Choice Theory. 
 
2.3.2 Public Choice Theory 
Although critiques of public administration draw theoretical supp rt from various economic 
principles, several authors identify the role of public choice theory as especially pivotal in 
providing a basis for post-bureaucratic forms of organization in the public sector (United 
Nations, 2000; Hughes; 2003; Osborne, 2006). Derived from new institutional economics, the 
theory seeks to provide a persuasive account for why governments fail to produce socially 
and economically optimal outcomes. Following in the reductionist tradition of economics, it 
relies on methodological individualism to account for the behaviour of political actors 
including politicians, bureaucrats, political parties and interests groups (Ostrom and Ostrom, 
1971:93). 
 
The theory rests upon various assumptions about individual behaviour, the most common of 
which hold that individuals are: 
 
• Self interested, possessing full awareness of their preferences 
• Rational, implying an ability to rank their preferences 
• Guided by the principle of utility maximization and as such, able to 
calculate the relative costs and benefits of pursuing a given preference and 
typically taking the action that yields the maximum amount of utility, or 
satisfaction (Ostrom and Ostrom, 
1971; Dunleavy, 1991) 
 
These assumptions, when attributed to political actors cast doubt on traditional assumptions 
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of benevolent bureaucrats, bureaucracies and governments. According to Hughes (2003:11) 
 
“Instead of being motivated by the public interest, bureaucrats, like anyone else, are assumed to be 
motivated by their own selfish interest. Bureaucracies do not work well when looked at from this 
perspective because individual bureaucrats are regarded as trying to maximize their own utility at the 
cost of their agency; maximizing their own welfare and not the public interest. Similarly, politicians are 
not to be trusted as they maximize votes and/ or money.” 
 
According to this perspective of the public sector, bureaucrats are inclined to maximize their 
bureaus’ budgets because of their own rational considerations, which may include variables 
such as salary, prestige, reputation and patronage (Tullock, 1965; Niskanen, 1971). When 
aggregated, the consequence of self serving-behaviour by political actors is ‘government 
failure’, symptoms of which include bloated bureaus, excessive government expenditures and 
the capture of public policies through rent seeking behaviours (von Mises, 1944; Hayek, 
1960; Batley and Larbi, 2004). Public choice theory, therefore, provides a rationale for the 
introduction of the market mechanism into the public sector to induce better performance and 
service delivery. 
 
Despite its influence on NPM, public choice theory has received significant critical attention, 
not least because of the shortcomings of its core assumption of rationality. The theory, it is 
worth  remembering,  suggests  that  sub-optimal  social  outcomes  are  consequences  of  the 
pursuit  of  rationally self-interested  actions  on  the  part  of  individual  bureaucrats.  Taken 
beyond the political context, the assumption implies that the pursuit of collective goods 
through any form of collective action in society would be against self-interest, and therefore 
irrational. Examples abound, however, of seemingly rational and uncoerced individuals 
engaged in collective action towards socially desired outcomes. The action of a stranger 
through, for example, an anonymous donation to a charity does not immediately indicate 
rational self-interest by said stranger, particularly as it brings no discernable returns. Yet, 
people make anonymous donations daily in full awareness of this. Similarly, individuals may 
and often do risk personal injuries by participating in demonstrations against repressive 
regimes, nonetheless such conduct does not conform to the assumption of inherent self- 
interest advanced by rational choice theory (Heath, 1976; Elster, 1989). 
 
Within the bureaucracy, it is conceivable that there are likely to be non-utility maximizing 
bureaucrats that, according to the theory would be considered irrational. While reliant on the 
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core tenets of public choice theory, Dunleavy’s (1991) bureau-shaping model supports this 
view by presenting an opposing account of bureaucratic behaviour that suggests that, among 
other things, bureaucrats would not necessarily prefer expanded bureaucracies, but smaller 
agencies, closer to political power. The prevalence of several examples of collective action 
throughout society presents a challenge to public choice theory’s explanatory power in 
accounting for social and bureaucratic behaviour. Other charges have centred on the theory’s 
perceived ideological bias, reductionism and inability to withstand empirical scrutiny (John, 
2000). 
 
2.3.3 Managerialism 
Managerialism is generally considered the second theoretical strand of NPM (Hood, 1991; 
Hughes, 2003). A useful account of managerialism is that of Pollitt (1990) who takes it to 
mean beliefs and practices grounded in the assumption of a managerial solution to political 
and social problems. Implicit in this idea is the view of management as generic, readily 
transferable to any context and superior to other methods of organizing public activities 
(Hood, 1991; United Nations, 2005). Farnham and Horton (1999:41) identify five axioms of 
managerialism, which are that: 
 
“Social progress requires continuing increases in economic productivity; productivity increases come 
from applying sophisticated technologies; the application of these technologies can only be achieved 
through a disciplined workforce; business success depends on the professionalism of skilled managers; 
and to perform their crucial role, managers must have the right to manage.” 
 
From the foregoing, some important points about managerialism emerge. The identification 
of social progress as contingent on increasing economic productivity is indicative of a shift in 
administrative   values.   Using   Hood’s ( 1991:11)   typology   of   core   values   in   public 
management, economic productivity conforms to sigma-type administrative values, which 
emphasise output orientation, frugality and cost consciousness in the provision of public 
services. This is in contrast with the traditional model of administration that, reflecting theta- 
type values, assumes a legally based conception of what constitutes administrative success 
and failure. The values include legitimacy and due process, as well as the achievement of 
fairness and the proper discharge of duties (Hood, 1991:11). Managerialism, according to 
Farnham and Horton (1999), demands the achievement of value for money, expressed in the 
‘three Es’ of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Integral to the pursuit of value for money is the idea that managers must have a great degree 
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of discretionary control over vital elements of the organization, such as human resources, 
budgetary systems as well as rewards and incentive structures (Farnham, 1999; Hughes, 
2003). This is in contrast to the functions of bureaucrats in the tradition model, whose 
agency is frequently portrayed by critics as confined to custodianship of rules and procedures 
(Hughes, 2003). In his examination of the ‘ global revolution in public management’, Kettl 
(1997) perceives two variants of managerialism, namely the ‘let the managers manage’ and 
the ‘make the managers manage’ approaches. The former advances the idea that operational 
constraints, not civil servants, are the source of inefficient and ineffective government 
performance. To improve organizational performance, therefore, the perspective seeks to 
liberate public managers from the strictures of bureaucratic control and provide them with the 
autonomy to creatively and flexibly achieve organizational objectives (Kettl, 1997; Aberbach, 
1999; Schick, 2002; Terry, 2005). 
 
Borrowing from new institutional economics, the ‘make the managers manage’ approach 
assumes a more sceptical account of managerial motivations in public agencies. Believing 
managers to have little inducement to manage in the public interest under public sector 
monopoly  conditions,  it  advocates  the  use  of  markets  and  competition  to  align  their 
objectives to the wider goals of the public organization (Kettl, 1997; Terry, 2005). In a so- 
called ‘aggressive’ NPM reformer such as New Zealand, contracts effectively replaced 
permanent tenure as the incentive mechanisms of choice for improving government 
performance (Scott, Ball and Dale, 1997). Departmental chief executives and other senior 
public service managers, for example, are held personally accountable for the performance of 
their departments by their ministers. Accountability is enforced by fixed-term contracts and 
negotiated annual performance agreements that are aligned to rewards and penalties (Scott et 
al, 1997; Bale and Dale, 1998; Levy, 2010). 
 
As  with  other  elements  of  the  NPM,  managerialism  has  been  subject  to  much  critical 
treatment in the literature. The perceived perversion of what are considered distinctive public 
sector characteristics by managerialism’s implicit assumption of the transferability of private 
sector  methods  of  organization  to  the  public  sphere  present  one  such  area  of  criticism 
(Stewart and Walsh, 1994; Hughes, 2003). The challenge of importing private sector 
techniques into public sector activities is common to many countries, with difficulties 
experienced in ‘managing’ performance particularly instructive. Schick (2002:24) concurs in 
his observation that it is easier to ‘let’, rather than ‘make’ managers manage, noting the 
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relative underdevelopment of ‘accountability frameworks’ such as performance audits and 
specifications of targets in various countries that have undertaken managerial reforms. 
 
2.4 Public Sector Reforms in Developed Countries 
Though frequently presented as a ‘global phenomenon’, there have been significant 
differences in the manner in and extent to which the public sector reforms of the 1970s and 
1980s unfolded in the industrial nations in which they emerged. The literature generally 
charts a distinction between leading reformers from English speaking countries such as New 
Zealand,  Australia  and  the  United  Kingdom,  and  those  considered  variously  as  late, 
pragmatic and reluctant reformers, such as the countries of continental Europe and the 
developing world (Kettl, 1997; Hood, 2000; Pollitt, 2000;Manning, 2001; Levy, 2010). 
 
As noted above the convergence of several forces, including the crises of global financial 
systems and the intellectual ascendancy of neo-classical economic thinking in the public 
sphere are commonly cited motives for the eventual reforms of the 1980s. In the United 
Kingdom a decisive factor - that Pollitt and Bouck ert (2000) regard as central to public 
management reforms - was the emergence of ‘ elite  decision makers’ in the form of Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party, particularly its ‘New Right’ wing. Upon 
assuming power in 1979, deference to the private sector ideas and techniques became a 
prominent feature of the Conservative Government’s policies; a change evident from early on 
in the efficiency scrutinies that invoked private sector techniques and expertise in seeking to 
eliminate waste and reduce costs (Ferlie et al, 1996; Rouse, 1999; Mascarenhas, 2003). 
 
The introduction of the Financial Management Initiative (FMI) in 1982 highlighted a shift in 
the management of performance in central government (Rouse, 1999; Alford and Hughes, 
2007). According to Horton (1999:147), this entailed the delegation of greater responsibility 
to managers, the establishment of systems for clarifying their objectives, measuring their 
output and improving their performances as well as the development of 
 
“common accounting systems and systems for monitoring and controlling expenditure [for] ensuring that 
financial information was available on costs, expenditure patterns and budget profiles and providing a 
much clearer picture of how resources were being used and how much programmes cost”. 
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned developments, the bureaucratic organization of the civil 
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service, typified by monolithic departments under strong ministerial control, was deemed an 
obstacle to effective managerial performance. On the recommendations of a report titled 
Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps3, the government embarked on 
further reforms that structurally separated the policy-making and executive functions of 
departments.  Operationally decentralized agencies were created within departments with 
chief executives responsible for their performances, while the role of policy-making remained 
the preserve of core departments (Mascarenhas, 1993; Cohn, 1997; Hogwood, 1999; Horton, 
1999). 
 
In addition to the use of business type management principles and the attempts to separate the 
policy making from administrative functions, the introduction of competition to the public 
services formed a key policy of British public management reforms under the Conservative 
government. ‘Contractualism’ or government by contract underpinned these developments. 
Building on the structurally decoupled administrative functions, competition in the public 
service provision entailed the exposure of public agencies to external and internal markets 
with contracts enforcing terms such as outputs and penalties (Hoggett, 1996; Rouse, 1999; 
Alford and Hughes, 2007). In addition to the increased private sector role in the public sector 
noted above, Cope (1999) identifies the sale of government assets and commercialization of 
many public bodies as among the three prominent manifestations of privatization in Britain. 
 
The public sector reform experiences of the United States present interesting contrasts to 
those of parliamentary democracies such as Britain and New Zealand. Lynn (2006) describes 
them as disjointed and non-linear; distinct from the comparatively systematic and 
comprehensive   changes   witnessed   in   some   of   the   leading   reformers,   notably   the 
‘Westminster’ nations.  One  account  offered  for  this  is  that  many  of  the  developments 
subsequently termed ‘managerial’ in Europe and the antipodean countries had been 
components of ‘American administrative ideology’  for nearly a century (Lynn, 2006:104). 
This is a view echoed by Kickert (1996:5), who identifies a “belief in the curative function of 
management” as idiosyncratic of American culture and its reverence of individualism. The 
advent of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management movement in the early decades of the 
20th   century and its adoption at the Federal level of American administration, along with 
other managerial developments such as systematic privatization of public services in the 
                                                          
3 Jenkins, K., Caines, K and Jackson, A. 1988. Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps. London: 
HMSO. 
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1950’s, are instructive examples of enduring American embrace of generic management 
principles (Lynn, 2006:98). 
 
Another account for the specificity of U.S administrative developments has been the political 
context for reform. The separation of powers’ doctrine, constitutionally provided to negate 
tyranny, presents a significant challenge to public administration and its reform in the U.S. 
Rockman and Thiam (2009) note the preponderance for ambiguity of administrative authority 
in the system arising from it. This is something that, particularly in the past three decades, has 
been exacerbated by different parties controlling the executive and legislative branches of 
government as well as deeper divisions in the parties’ policies. The consequences of this 
‘convoluted’ nature of the American system renders the bureaucracy a highly contested 
terrain and relegates reform efforts to political strategies for either aggrandizing a particular 
branch of government or distributing power (Aberbach and Rockman, 2001; Rockman and 
Thiam, 2009). 
 
The administrative reform initiatives proposed by the Clinton administration from 1993 
represented the first efforts to adapt the NPM reform agenda to the American system. 
Although previous attempts at federal level administrative reform, notably under the Reagan 
administration, had been guided by ideological currents similar to those underpinning the 
NPM agenda, the National Performance Review (NPR) was generally considered its first 
incarnation in the United States (Aberbach and Rockman, 1999; Rockman, 2001; Lynn, 
2006; Dunn and Miller, 2007). 
 
Influenced to a significant extent by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler’s (1992) Reinventing 
Government4, the NPR was considered distinct to previous approaches to federal reform, that 
were influenced by ideologically driven opposition towards government and public servants. 
According to Rockman (2001) the NPR identified the systems within which civil servants 
worked, and not bureaucrats themselves, as constraints to the effective and efficient operation 
of the federal government. In particular, the problem was deemed a consequence of the 
“mismatch  between  the  government’s industrial  age  structures  and  the  high  speed  and 
flexible nature of the information age in which people were now living” (Rockman and 
Thiam, 2009:212). 
                                                          
4 Osborne, D and Gaeblar, T. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the 
Public Sector from Schoolhouse to State House, City Hall to Pentagon. New York: Penguin Books. 
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The solution proposed by the NPR was for ‘entrepreneurial government’ to supplant the 
discredited bureaucratic paradigm. Reflecting concepts and language consistent with NPM’s 
managerialist strand, the principle themes of entrepreneurial government were: 
 
• The reduction of ‘red tape’ - which was central to the federal government’s 
efforts to streamline operations and attain the ‘flexibility’ required for the 
information age. The NPR envisaged that the ‘casting aside’ of excessive 
rules and regulations would re- orient accountability from the adherence to 
rules to the achievement of results. 
• Putting customers first - which entailed insisting on customer satisfaction 
• Empowering frontline officials through the decentralization of authority 
• Getting back to basics – which implied the need for constant re-
examination of the roles of federal government agencies’ and the 
reengineering of processes to enhance effectiveness  while  minimizing  
costs  (Moe,  1994;  Carroll,  1995;  Lynn,  2006; Rockman and Thiam, 
2009). 
 
An important managerial legacy bequeathed to American administration by the reinvention 
movement, and one synonymous with NPM reform programme, has been the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, which mandated federal agencies to formulate 
performance plans, conduct performance evaluations and report their progress. Beyond this, 
Rockman (2001) suggests a more spiritual, than operational resonance between the NPR and 
NPM. This is a sentiment shared by Lynn (2003) who suggests that while comprising 
managerial deregulation and public entrepreneurship, the reinvention movement was largely 
devoid of market-based reforms. 
 
The “President’s Management Agenda” (PMA) undertaken by the administration of George 
W. Bush is regarded as a better representative of NPM reform in America (Lynn, 2006). 
According to the PMA (2002), three principles underpinned the reforms. Government would 
be “citizen centred, not bureaucracy centred; results orientated; and market based, actively 
promoting rather than stifling innovation through competition” (2002:4). In addition to its 
emphasis on the market-imitative techniques synonymous with NPM, including greater 
freedom for federal managers and competitive sourcing of administrative tasks, the PMA also 
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introduced a new system for evaluating the performances of Federal programmes, namely the 
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). 
 
Along with Britain, the antipodean states of Australia and New Zealand are considered 
fervent adherents of NPM ideas and practices, with their approaches – especially that of the 
New Zealand - described variously as pure, radical, aggressive and exemplary models of 
public sector reorganization (Mascarenhas, 1993; Kettl, 1997; Bale and Dale, 1998; 
Christensen and Lægreid, 2001). Although both countries’ reform endeavours have reflected 
trends  towards  markets  and  management  and  away  from  the  traditional  bureaucratic 
paradigm, there have been discernable divergences in, for example, reform frameworks and 
processes, as well as the ideas underpinning reform. Halligan (1997:18) identifies the 
influence of economic ideas as the most significant difference, observing that New Zealand, 
to a greater extent than Australia, has relied on institutional economic theories to provide the 
conceptual platform for reforms. 
 
Using Kettl’s (1997) dualistic conception of managerialist reforms, Australia is said to have 
as pursued a ‘let the managers manage’ strategy, with New Zealand opting to ‘make the 
managers manage’. Core to the approach followed by Australia, as noted earlier, was the idea 
that bureaucratic structures and procedures inhibited improvements to government’s 
performance. The Australian approach to reform, therefore, centred on “the restructuring of 
its public service, the establishment of a system of financial management and the 
establishment of efficiency scrutinies to enhance public sector performance” (Mascarenhas, 
1993:323). Driven chiefly by its Treasury department, New Zealand’s approach of ‘making 
managers manage’ was premised on economic theories of individual behaviour - notably 
agency theory, which conceives of bureaucratic elites as rationally self-interested - and 
therefore resolved to steer managerial behaviour through market-imitative incentives (Kettl, 
1997; Levy, 2010). Rules and processes were jettisoned in favour of performance contracts, 
under which managers and chief executives were subjected to rewards or sanctions based on 
performance (Christensen and Lægreid, 2001). 
 
A review of public sector reforms in developed countries reveals considerable variations in 
the manner and extent of their application, even amongst countries of similar administrative 
traditions. Wider differences become apparent when considering the experiences of the 
developed  countries  of  Continental  Europe  -  notably  Germany  and  France  –  generally 
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depicted as pragmatic reformers. Despite applying selected elements of the public 
management approach, these countries, notably France, retained strong features of traditional 
administration such as career-based personnel systems (OECD, 2004). Pollitt (2000) and 
Minogue (2000) point to inherent features in the administrative systems of Germany and 
France, and their political and legal foundations, to account for the relative difficulty by 
reformers in those countries to institute the comprehensive administrative reforms demanded 
by NPM. 
 
The apparent reform divergence within and between developed countries and, as will be 
explored, their developing counterparts have added to the debates about NPM, particularly 
around its universal applicability, suitability, and its overall legacy. Those sympathetic (at 
least initially) to NPM, including organizations like the World Bank and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had touted it as a legitimate successor to 
an administrative paradigm unfit for purpose in a rapidly changing world. To these NPM 
proponents and others, a management perspective underpinned by economic theories and 
market values such as efficiency and effectiveness, offered recourse to an administrative 
framework considered unresponsive to the needs of citizens (Hughes, 2003; OECD, 2004). 
With markets and competition, centrepieces of the NPM approach, it was envisaged that 
reform  strategies  such  as  contracting  out  and  privatization  would  be  better  suited  to 
generating cost savings, producing better quality and more responsive services than those 
afforded by the bureaucracy (Alford and Hughes, 2007:8). 
 
Of the various critiques of the public sector reforms undertaken in Western, and particularly 
English speaking countries, significant attention has been focused on their tendency towards 
the NPM reform agenda and the apparent contradictions emerging from its prescriptions, 
especially in the ‘maturity’ stage of its development (Hood, 2000; Hood and Peters, 2004; 
Terry, 2005). In his examination of public sector restructuring in Britain, Hogget (1996) 
observed that operational decentralization had been accompanied by ‘sophisticated’ forms of 
organizational control that reproduced the formalizing tendencies of bureaucratic 
organization.  Performance m a n a g e m e n t  s y s t e m s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  a s  a n  
e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  paradoxes within ‘post-bureaucratic’ organizational reforms. Specifically, 
Hoggett (1996:22) suggests  that  their  associated  techniques,  such  as  performance  
monitoring,  have  often hindered more than helped public sector organizations with oversight 
mechanisms like audits, performance review systems, peer assessments and appraisals 
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consuming significant amounts of time and producing goal displacement, particularly in the 
in the health, educational and local government sectors. 
 
Maor (1999) and Peters and Pierre (2001) have similarly noted contradictions arising from 
devolved forms of management in the public sector. In a comparative analysis of six 
parliamentary regimes, including Australia, New Zealand, U.K and Canada, Maor (1999) 
concludes that reforms initially intended to improve management capacity in the public sector 
served to undermine senior civil servants’ tenure security and actually brought about greater 
politicization of the public sector. According to Maor’s (1999) study, NPM-inspired changes 
to civil service systems, such as the introduction of open recruitment and fixed-term 
appointments, have increased opportunities for partisan-based appointments or dismissals, 
along with other forms of politicization. This has largely been a result of political principals’ 
desires to reassert some semblance of control over their agents, from a perceived position of 
operational i n c a p a c i t y .  The  nature  of  this  ‘managerial’   paradox,  however,  has  
been questioned  by  Hood  and  Peters  (2004:271)  who  suggest,  among  other  things,  
that  the increased dismissals highlighted in Maor’s study “might simply reflect decreased 
tolerance for performance failure, in line with the intended effects of managerial reforms.” 
 
Various authors have identified NPM-inspired reforms as a threat to the foundations of the 
public  sector  and  a  challenge  to  its  perception  as  a  bastion  for  substantive  democracy. 
Scholars such as Box et al., (2001), Haque (2001) Fountain, (2001) and Terry (2005) have 
cited the supposed decline of public accountability, the erosion of the public-private 
distinction and the ‘thinning’ of administrative institutions as among the symptoms of the 
degradation of the public domain. According to Box et al. (2001), the market model of 
administration that NPM advances overlooks substantive issues that previously preoccupied 
public administrators. The neglect of core issues, such as poverty and disability is a 
consequence of the theories on which the model is founded, which, it should be remembered 
view collective action as an aggregation of rationally based individual choices. The outcome, 
according to Box et al., (2001) 
 
“is a tendency to reduce complex social and economic issues to the management of diversity at the level 
of the individual organization… Substantive issues at the core of contemporary life, such as racism, 
poverty, and disability, become individual problems rather than matters to be addressed through 
substantive democracy.” 
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In its philosophy and application NPM has not been without its critics and the growth of 
literature both condemning it to varying degrees of obsolescence and proclaiming emergent 
‘post N P M ’    administrative   forms,   such   as   Public   Value   Pragmatism,   New   Public 
Governance, Public Value Management and Digital Era Governance, has been instructive 
(Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler, 2005; Stoker, 2005; Osborne, 2006; Alford and 
Hughes, 2007). The ‘new’ administrative approaches share some similarities, particularly in 
their prescriptions for treating the perceived weaknesses of their antecedents. One area of 
convergence   has   been   their   emphasis   on   collaborative   networks,   partnerships   and 
reintegration to replace the governing structures associated with NPM and traditional 
administration. According to Pollitt (2004), a motive behind ‘joining-up’ of government - a 
key policy plank of the Blair administration - was to counter problems of duplication, policy 
and programme contradictions and the emergence of organizational silos that have been 
attributed to the fragmenting effects of policies such as disaggregation and devolution. 
 
Following the trends of the British government, whose white paper on Modernising 
Government5 in 1999 broadened the scope of the debate on governing the British state, other 
commonwealth countries such as New Zealand, Australia and Canada have also been active 
in advancing forms of coordination (Alford and Hughes, 2007; Halligan, 2007). An essential 
claim of network forms of governance is that in a globalizing world and the environment of 
complexity and uncertainty this has brought about, states can no longer claim exclusive 
legitimacy as the locus of public decision-making, by virtue of the outcomes of party political 
processes (United Nations, 2005). Network type arrangements have, therefore, become 
necessary for coordinating interactions between increasingly interdependent ‘stakeholders’ 
such as governments, the private sector, non-government organizations and other civil society 
organizations. Osborne (2006:384) asserts that these ‘new’ administrative regimes recognize 
“both a plural state, where multiple inter-dependent actors contribute to the delivery of public 
services and a pluralist state, where multiple processes inform the policy making”. 
 
Other commonalities between ‘post NPM’ forms of governance have been their emphases on 
outcomes defining governments’ interventions, as distinct from the importance given to 
inputs and outputs by previous models of administration. Stoker (2005) and Alford and 
Hughes (2007), for example, highlight the pursuit of ‘public value’, the definition of which is 
said to extend beyond the standard economic designation of a public good to describe, among 
                                                          
5 White Paper. 1999. Modernising Government. London: HMSO. 
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others, a product of deliberations between government and relevant stakeholders. The value 
of pragmatism has also emerged as a shared feature of the new governance models. In their 
model of Public Value Pragmatism, Alford and Hughes (2007) argue that both traditional 
administration and the NPM conformed to ‘one best way’ thinking. Eschewing strict 
adherence to any specific managerial devices such as hierarchy and contracting out of 
services, pragmatism in the procurement of public services has meant determining the 
managerial tool to be used based upon on considerations of “the nature of the task, the 
context, and the available technologies and resources” (2007:141).” 
 
2.5 Public Sector Reforms in Developing Countries 
The wave of public sector reforms that occurred in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s was not 
unique to developed countries.  During this period, developing countries also undertook 
initiatives to transform their public sectors, with some reflecting the reform patterns in the 
‘leading’ reformers of the developed world. Notwithstanding similarities in the types of 
reforms  implemented,  the  literature  points  to  significant  differences  in  the  comparative 
reform experiences of developed and developing countries. To provide the necessary context 
for a review of public sector reforms in developing countries, brief reference must be given to 
the administrations bequeathed by colonial rule. As a great deal of the literature on the post- 
colonial public sector is focused on sub-Saharan Africa, it follows that this review will reflect 
that predilection. 
 
With due cognizance of differences in the colonial experiences of African states, especially 
between the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries, a common path taken by 
most states following the surge of decolonizations from the middle of the 20th  century was 
one that placed the state at the centre of development efforts (Balogun, 2001). Sandbrook 
(1993:22) suggests an historical inevitably about this given various factors, including: 
 
“the interventionist colonial traditions, the national elite’s visceral association of capitalism with 
imperialism…a professed commitment to social equity…and the new state manager’s drive for self- 
aggrandizement”. 
 
With the exception of a few countries, colonial administration had largely been intended to 
serve the narrow interests of the metropolitan power and its functionaries. The ensuing 
administrative legacy, therefore, was one that, at its most extreme was characterised by 
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elitism, personal administration, and the lack of a bureaucratic presence in many territories: 
“imperfect   imitations   of   the   Weberian   model”   (Adamolekun,   2002:374).   Referring 
specifically to sub-Saharan African countries, Ayee (2008) suggests that the new role 
envisaged for the public sector by the nascent post-colonial regimes was a well-intentioned 
means of overcoming their developmental deficiencies. Citing Wunsch and Oluwu (1991), he 
identifies five ‘complementary’ strategies pursued by African leaders: 
 
• “The replacement of competitive politics by one or no-party systems 
ostensibly dedicated to national unity; 
• Reliance upon unified bureaucratic structures exclusively accountable to 
the central government to define, organize and manage the production of 
public goods and services along the lines determined at all levels by a 
‘national plan’; 
• No legitimate significant role be allowed for the for local government, 
including traditional, ethnically related groups as well as modern 
institutions of true local government; 
• Executive authority be maximized at the expense of such other 
institutions as the legislature, judiciary, regional governments, and press 
and private organizations; 
• The national budget to be regarded as the primary source of funding 
for the development agenda, to be raised out of the largest economic 
sectors: either agriculture or mineral extraction” (Ayee, 2008:5) 
 
The confluence of the foregoing development strategies contributed to the emergence of post- 
colonial African public sectors that were far removed from the Weberian ideals they had 
sought to reproduce. What developed in many instances were, in effect, spoils systems that 
were characterised by inequitable access to government controlled resources such as 
employment and contracts - often on the basis of religious, regional or ethnic affiliations - 
patrimonialism, the politicization of the civil service and the extension of state involvement 
to most spheres of the economy and society (Larbi, 1999; Balogun, 2001; Hope, 2001; Moss, 
2007). Occurring in a climate of deteriorating economic conditions that included capital 
flight, falling commodity prices and high rates of inflation, the governance crises described 
above impelled most developing countries to seek credit facilities from international financial 
institutions by the 1980’s (Larbi, 1999:5). 
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2.5.1 Structural Adjustment Programmes 
One area of broad unanimity in the literature on developing countries’ public sector reforms 
is that the public sector reforms that commenced in most developing countries in the early 
1980s were shaped to a large extent by the policy-based lending practices effected by the 
international donor organizations, led by the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Ayeni, 2002; Bangura and Larbi, 2006; Ayee, 
2008). According to Ayee (2008:56) the ostensible aim of the loans was to stabilize the 
prevailing m a c r o -economic c r i s e s .  Pursuant  to  this  objective,  the  general   intent  
of intervention  was  the  minimisation  the  state’s role  in  the  market  and  the  creation  
of “incentives for a process of resource allocation driven by economics rather than 
politics” (Hyden, 2006:129). Specific policy reforms demanded of sub-Saharan African 
countries included the freezing of public service vacancies, removal of exchange controls, 
privatization of public enterprises and broad cuts to public expenditures. 
 
An awareness of the capacity constraints faced by d veloping states in undertaking 
stabilization  measures  prompted  international   donor  agencies  to  prescribe  a  second 
generation of reforms that is said to have commenced in the 1990s (Hyden, 2006; Ayee, 
2008). A notable feature of this phase was the broadening of the reform agenda beyond the 
narrow focus of the initial economic initiatives.  According to  the World  Bank’s World 
Development Report, The State in a Changing World (1997), the scope of the reforms was 
extended to include a „good governance’ agenda, in which reforms to the political context, 
such as the establishment of multi-party democratic systems of government were given equal 
priority as those considered economic reforms (Clapham, 1996). Some of the initiatives 
implemented by developing countries in this period were decentralization, performance 
management  and  the  contracting  out  of  service  delivery  (Bangura  and  Larbi,  2006). 
According to Ayee (2008) a third phase of public sector reforms in sub-Saharan African 
countries beginning in the last decade can be discerned. Reform policy issues in this stage 
have centred on improving public service delivery and accountability, with significant 
emphasis given to enhancing values such as responsiveness and effectiveness. 
 
2.5.2 Evaluation of Public Sector Reforms in Developing Countries 
From the literature surveyed, the general assessments of the implementation and impacts of 
adjustment-inspired public sector reforms in developing countries have largely been 
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unfavourable. A persistent criticism of SAPs, and by extension the international development 
agencies responsible for their dissemination, addresses the ideological nature of the initial 
prescriptions (Balogun and Mutahaba, 1989; Sandbrook, 1993). The mechanistic application 
of stabilization and adjustment programmes - underpinned by the neo-liberal orthodoxy - to a 
diverse range of developing countries, from Eastern European to post-authoritarian Latin 
American states, betrayed a lack of awareness of the distinct and complex challenges facing 
different countries and regions (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Batley and Larbi, 2004). 
Hyden (2006) suggests that the strong advocacy for economic liberalization was not only 
naïve  for  ignoring  institutional  realities,  especially  in  African  countries,  but  generated 
political opposition to the reforms, perhaps tempering the positive effects they may have had. 
 
Related to the above, significant criticism has also been directed at the politicized manner of 
adjustment measures. Pender (2001:399), for example, observes the close association of 
adjustment reforms with “the worldview of Western elites at the end of the Cold War, notably 
the ascendancy of the UK's Margaret Thatcher, the USA's Ronald Reagan, West Germany's 
Helmut Kohl and, subsequently [the] 'Washington consensus’”. The implications of the 
implementation of policies that sought to whittle down the African state at all costs is that 
while politically expedient for international lenders, they were especially detrimental to states 
already struggling to provide basic services. The importance of state intervention was made 
more apparent in light of the successes of East Asian countries, which retained strong 
interventionist states to complement rather than replace market forces. 
 
In terms of impacts, the reduction of public expenditure in crucial areas such as transport, 
education and healthcare held adverse consequences for developing states, including welfare 
and unemployment effects. Measures such as salary freezes and retrenchments, for example, 
compromised the fragile capacities of civil services by creating discontent and insecurity, and 
encouraging absenteeism, corruption and hostility towards government by public officials 
(Balogun and Mutahaba, 1989; Bangura and Larbi, 2006; Ayee, 2008). One lasting effect of 
the decline in competitiveness of civil service pay, relative to that of the private sector, has 
been the loss of experienced and qualified professionals in the former, to both the private 
sector and other countries (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Far from arresting government 
failure and providing the platform for appreciable, private sector led growth, the initial effects 
of structural adjustments were detrimental, particularly to the fragile administrative capacities 
of developing countries. 
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The advent of private sector practices to developing countries through the funnels of aid and 
conditionalities has been subject to considerable debate. The extent to which these have been 
suitable for export to developing countries has been a key point of contention. Minogue 
(2001) notes that there has been little conclusive evidence to suggest efficiency gains from 
adjustment related economic reforms. To good or bad effect, adjustment-induced reforms 
have played a central role in redefining the public sector in developing countries. From an 
initially narrow emphasis on attaining fiscal stability and freeing market forces, the reforms 
have broadened in scope to prioritize issues of public sector performance and poverty 
alleviation. Given the wide variety of reform measures undertaken by developing countries 
under the auspices of international financial institutions and donors, it is worth examining in 
closer detail, some of the more recurrent themes. 
 
2.5.2.1 Privatization 
Privatization has been a commonly used policy device for reformers seeking to reduce their 
expenditures and, particularly in developing countries, rid the public sector of the extensive 
corruption and bureaucratic management with which their public enterprises have long been 
associated (Hope, 2001:126). 
 
While early efforts of privatization in Africa date back to 1960, when the government of Côte 
D’Ivoire undertook a water concession agreement with French company, SAUR, more 
intensive attempts commenced in the late 1980s with the support the of the international 
donor community (Berthélemy et al., 2004). The initial stages of privatization in developing 
countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, was modest and early candidates for 
reform included relatively small services enterprises involved in waste collection, road 
maintenance, security and hospital cleaning (Batley and Larbi, 2004:129). The findings of a 
World Bank policy research report, Bureaucrats in Business: the Economics and Politics of 
Government Ownership (1995:27), support this view by pointing out that privatization levels 
in Sub–Saharan Africa between 1980-87 to 1988-1993 were lower than any other developing 
region, with transactions increasing from 210 to 254 in the thirteen year period compared 
with 108 to 367 in Asia and 136 to 561 in Latin America. 
 
According to the Berthélemy et al. (2004) the mid 1990s witnessed a peak in the number of 
privatization transactions in sub-Saharan African countries. One factor attributed to this is the 
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shift in priority from the initial reforms focused on stabilization to those that emphasised 
broader administrative transformations that included reforms to public enterprises (2004:27). 
The gradual decline of transactions after the mid 1990s was followed by a sharp rise in the 
proceeds from privatization transactions.  Berthélemy et  al., (2004:28) account for 
this ‘peculiar sequencing’ by suggesting that: 
 
“the first privatizations were numerous but yielded relatively little in the way of proceeds. In contrast, 
when it came to privatisation of utilities and strategic sectors of the economy, the process slowed down 
in terms of numbers but, initially at least, brought higher proceeds.” 
 
Despite the growth in privatization activity in the early 1990s, relative to developed countries 
the presence of state owned enterprises in developing economies has remained high and, 
where privatized, organizations have frequently raised service costs to the detriment of 
recipients (McCourt and Minogue, 2001; Bangura and Larbi, 2006; Kikeri and Burman, 
2007). Cook (2001:156) points to various factors that have impeded the effective 
implementation of privatization in developing countries including imperfectly developed 
markets and the lack of regulatory capacity. Concerning the latter, Bayliss and Fine (2008:49 
- 51) argue that poor legislative frameworks, the weak technical skills of government 
regulators and negotiators and the politicization of regulatory interventions have contributed 
to poor oversight of newly privatized companies. Given their difficulties with achieving full- 
scale privatization, many governments in sub-Saharan African countries have subsequently 
turned to reforms such as commercialization and regulation as the means to facilitating the 
ends of private sector entry into their economies in the long term (Bayliss and Fine, 2008:91). 
 
Berthélemy et al. (2004:43) suggest that the most common method of privatization used in 
sub-Saharan Africa by 2002 was the competitive sale of shares or assets and liquidations. 
Other forms of privatizations used have been leases, management contracts, joint ventures 
and concessions. At the sectoral level, management contracts have been used most frequently 
for electricity and water utilities, yet even with these, significant difficulties have been 
experienced especially with long-term contracts. This is attested by the number of major 
privatization contracts that have either been terminated or are in mediation. Bayliss and Fine 
(2008:99) contend that this applies to three out of seven electricity privatization contracts and 
three of four joint water and electricity contractual arrangements Notable examples of these 
include a 30-year concession contract for combined water and electricity delivery in Chad 
that was terminated after 5 years in 2005, and Tanzania’s lease contract agreement in the 
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water sector, terminated after 18 months (2008:97). 
 
The general assessment of privatization in developing countries from the literature reviewed 
is that it has proved difficult, and where achieved, has imposed onerous requirements that 
have h a d  s i gn i f i c a n t  a d v e r s e  s o c i a l  e f f e c t s .  A c o m m o n  p r e d i c a m e n t  f o r  
go v e r nm en t s  ultimately accountable to their citizens for the delivery of services such as 
water and electricity has been balancing the commercial imperatives that drive private sector 
provision and broader social and political objectives. General condemnation has been directed 
to governments, who have often seemed eager to prioritize the needs of the private sector, at 
the expense of citizens who are among the poorest and have among the lowest access to basic 
services in the world (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005; Bayliss and Fine, 2008). 
 
2.5.2.2 Performance Management 
The development of performance-based forms of accountability has been common to the 
endeavours of reforming countries in the last three decades.  Performance management 
regimes have been put in place to elicit improvements in the performances of public sector 
organizations and employees. 
 
The literature reviewed indicates that a number of developing countries have implemented 
performance m a n a g e m e n t  r e f o r m s  o n  s o m e  l e v e l .  In s u b -Saharan A f r i c a , 
p r o m i n e n t  reformers in this regard include Botswana, Ghana, South Africa and Uganda. 
The latter introduced organizational level reforms in the early 1990s through its Results 
Oriented Management system (ROM). The main thrusts of ROM were the introduction of a 
performance management culture and strategic planning orientation. These were to be 
achieved through, among other things, the establishment of organizational mission and key 
objectives  and  the  development  of  performance  indicators  and  information  systems  to 
provide political heads with mechanisms to monitor and evaluate performance (Byarugaba, 
2006; Larbi, 2006). With its 1997 White Paper on the Transforming Public Service Delivery 
(Batho Pele), South Africa has also made significant attempts to improve service delivery. A 
notable example has been the introduction of performance contracting for selected public 
service positions at the individual level. In addition, legislations such as the Public Service 
Law Amendment Act of 1997 and the Public Service Regulation 1999/ 2001 have introduced 
performance contacting for senior civil servants and directors general (Kuye, 2006). 
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Although p e r f o r m a n c e  m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  h e l d  m u c h  a p p e a l  f o r  
r e f o r m i n g  d e v e l o p i n g  countries, particularly at the level of rhetoric, its 
implementation, especially in sub-Saharan Africa has tended to be incomplete (Kiragu and 
Mutahaba, 2006). Larbi (1999) maintains that the effective implementation of performance 
management frameworks has often been hampered by, among other things, limited 
managerial discretion, the unpredictability of budgets and lack of skilled and motivated 
personnel at ministerial and district level. Drawing on studies by Mallon (1995), the World 
Bank (1995), Shirley and Xu (1997), Larbi (1999:25- 26) notes the general absence of 
certain ‘preconditions’ in developing countries that are necessary for effective performance 
management. These include: 
 
•   “the need for governments (as principals) to state explicitly their objectives, 
prioritize them and translate into performance improvement targets; 
•   reliable and functional managerial information systems in place to enable 
management by results; and, 
•   the need for effective and competent monitoring agencies with skilled 
personnel.” 
 
The lack of sustained commitment to reforms from political and administrative leaders has 
been an important factor in the general inability by developing countries to establish the 
requisite conditions for successful performance management. Uganda’s Results-Oriented 
Management (ROM) is cited as an example of an approach to performance management that 
has remained largely rhetorical due to the lack of understanding and support given to it by 
political leaders (McCourt and Minogue, 2001; Kiragu and Mutahaba, 2006). Challenges 
have also emerged in the installation of new staff appraisal systems. In the case of Zambia, 
the Annual Performance Appraisal System that was intended to complement the performance 
management system has been underutilised, resulting in, according to Bwalya (2006:252) 
about a third (33.8) of public workers reporting not being subjected to performance 
evaluations and 65% not receiving performance targets. 
 
The literature reveals that performance management remains a work in progress in many sub- 
Saharan African countries. A common problem, even to developed countries, has been the 
establishment of adequate measures of performance. The lack of resources for practical 
exercises such as the training of public servants and, though contentious, the establishment of 
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performance-pay schemes, has also provided some significant challenges. So too has been the 
retention and use of strong elements of bureaucratic administration alongside new 
administrative techniques (Manning, 2001:300). The persistence of many African, Asian and 
Latin  American  countries  with  personnel  systems  that  tie  promotions  to  seniority  or 
examinations, and the centralization of recruitment controls, as happened in Uganda, for 
example, have hindered the development of a reform measure that requires some degree of 
managerial autonomy over resources (Polidano, 2001:51-52). 
 
2.5.2.3 Good Governance Reforms 
The seemingly ubiquitous public sector transformations of recent decades have not been 
driven solely by economic concerns. In most developing countries, the need to improve 
various aspects of governance has added impetus to their reform programmes. At the 
insistence of international finance institutions and other donors eager to see more effective 
use of their development assistance, the past two decades have witnessed the incorporation of 
a ‘good governance’ dimension to the reform agendas of many countries (Ayee, 2002; 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2005; Kiragu and Mutahaba, 2006). Although there is not 
a single accepted definition of what constitutes good governance, a useful summation of its 
key precepts is provided by Larbi (1999:10) who, taking the World Bank’s (1992) conception 
identifies it as comprising: 
 
• “the need for effective financial and human resource management through 
improved budgeting, accounting and reporting, and rooting out inefficiency 
particularly in public enterprises; 
• accountability in public services, including effective accounting, auditing 
and decentralization, and generally making public officials responsible for 
their actions and responsive to consumers; 
• a predictable legal framework with rules known in advance; a reliable and 
independent judiciary and law enforcement mechanisms; and 
• availability of information and transparency in order to enhance policy 
analysis, promote public debate and reduce the risk of corruption.” 
 
A notable feature of the foregoing description of good governance is the recognition of the 
importance of effective institutions in the political, administrative, judicial and economic 
spheres of the state for development. An institution integral to the pursuit of these objectives 
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on the African continent has been the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). 
Established in 2001 as an economic development initiative of the African Union (AU) and 
with  the  support  of  the  international  donor  community,  NEPAD  emphasizes  various 
governance initiatives, key among them being an economic and corporate governance 
initiative. Falling within this thematic area is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 
which serves as the central instrument for monitoring and assessing the adherence of states to 
the principles of good governance embraced by the AU and NEPAD (Akokpari, 2004). Key 
areas of focus include democracy and political governance, economic governance and 
management, corporate governance and socio-economic development. Participation in the 
APRM is open to all African countries on a voluntary basis, the purpose of which is to 
 
“foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic 
growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub regional and continental economic integration 
through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying 
deficiencies and assessing the needs of capacity building” (NEPAD Secretariat, 2003:2). 
 
To accomplish these goals member states are compelled to adopt certain standards and 
indicators through which progress can be monitored and assessed. Since its introduction in 
2003, 30 African countries have acceded to the APRM, with 14 member countries having 
undertaken self-assessments between January 2006 and January 2011 (NEPAD, 2011:1).6 
Although the APRM is still less than a decade old, the literature reveals that some progress 
towards good governance has been made by those countries that are party to the process and 
are subsequently implementing the recommended reforms in their Programmes of Actions. In 
the case of Ghana, for example, to counter issues of corruption and money laundering the 
government has instituted a variety of reforms including a whistleblowers act and a foreign 
exchange bill. In the wake of its review process from 2004 to 2006, Kenya has instituted 
legislation on witness protection and public procurement, while Rwanda has undertaken 
reforms to its business environment to relatively good effect with governance indicators 
showing progress made “in terms of control of corruption, government effectiveness and 
transparency of the regulatory networks” (Chêne, 2009:7-8). 
 
Despite some noteworthy achievements, the APRM continues to encounter some obstacles in 
engendering good governance on the continent. Given the politically sensitive nature of the 
                                                          
6 Countries that have undergone peer reviews are: Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria, Benin, Uganda, 
Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Lesotho, Mauritius and Ethiopia. 
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process, it has lent itself in some countries to political manipulation to the detriment of civil 
society participation. Tindifa and Luutu (2011) suggest, for example, that the independence 
of Uganda’s APRM Commission has been tainted by general perceptions that it was 
comprised  in  the  main  by  supporters  of  the  ruling  party:  yet  another  manifestation  of 
‘presidentialism’. The effectiveness of the APRM apparatus is also diminished by its lack of 
“definite elements of compulsion” (Akokpari, 2003:14). This is evident by the number of 
countries not signatory to the process, among which are those most in need of good 
governance reforms, including Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Other challenges facing the APRM 
include operational challenges, lack of progress monitoring and the lack of understanding of 
the process (Akokpari, 2003; Chêne, 2009). 
 
Summary 
This literature review has reviewed a wide array of scholarly contributions to the field of 
public sector reforms, paying special attention to recent developments. Important influences 
of these reforms have been NPM ideas which, as indentified in the review, have comprised 
economic theories of organization and private sector managerialist techniques and practices. 
The examination of public sector reforms in developing countries provides a background 
context for the following chapter, which will introduce Botswana. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Botswana’s Reform Context 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter will outline key aspects of Botswana’s governance architecture in order to 
present the systems, processes and rules within which public sector reforms in the country 
have occurred. In view of this goal, the chapter will first provide a brief profile of the 
country. This will be followed by a delineation of its constitutional framework, which gives 
legal mandate to Botswana’s institutions, notably the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. Following this will be an examination of the driving forces behind the country’s 
public sector reforms and the introduction of the three initiatives to be examined in the 
following chapter: the performance management systems, privatization and anti-corruption 
reforms. 
 
3.1 Botswana: A Profile 
The Republic of Botswana is a landlocked country in southern Africa bordered to the north, 
east,  south  and  west  by  Zambia,  Zimbabwe,  South  Africa  and  Namibia,  respectively. 
Formerly a protectorate of the British Empire, the country gained its independence in 1966. 
The written constitution of the Republic, which came into effect a year before its full 
independence,  provides  the  legislative  framework  by  which  the  state  is  governed.  A 
prominent provision in The Constitution of Botswana (1965) is the Bill of Rights (Chapter 
II), which enshrines the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, including 
freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the protection of the right to personal liberty, 
amongst others. 
 
As is common among parliamentary democracies, the constitution of Botswana recognises 
three distinct spheres of the state that are dealt with under separate provisions: parliament, the 
executive and the judiciary. According to section 57 of the constitution, the Parliament of 
Botswana consists of the President and a National Assembly, with 57 members of the latter 
elected directly from parliamentary constituencies and a further four serving as Specially 
Elected Members. The primary function of parliament is “to make laws for the peace, order 
and good government of Botswana” (Republic of Botswana, 1966: ss86). A second branch of 
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the state is the Executive, over which the President presides. The Executive branch of 
government comprises of the Vice-President, Cabinet Ministers and their Assistant Ministers, 
and permanent secretaries. The last branch of the Botswana government is the Judiciary, at 
the apex of which is the Chief Justice, and whose institutions include the Court of Appeal, 
High Courts, Magistrates and Customary Courts. 
 
The ninth National Development Plan (NDP 9) (Republic of Botswana, 2003) describes 
Botswana’s public sector as comprising principally of four components, each with 
administering agencies vested with statutory responsibilities. First, the Local Government 
Service consists of local authorities such as Land Boards and District Development 
Committees and is governed by the Department of Local Government Service Management 
(DLGSM). The DLGSM has legislative responsibility for among other things, the 
administration of human resource management policies for the local authorities. A second 
component is the Teaching Service, which is governed by the Teaching Service Management, 
and a third is the Public Enterprises Sector, which is overseen by the Public Enterprises 
Monitoring Unit (PEMU) and the Public Enterprises and Evaluation Privatization Agency 
(PEEPA). 
 
The Public Service represents the fourth component of Botswana’s public sector and 
comprises all the ministries and independent departments of central government. As the 
largest and according to its constituent institutions, most important component of the public 
sector, the administrative locus of the public service is the Department of Public Service 
Management (DPSM), wh ch is presided over by the Permanent Secretary to the President 
(PSP)  in  the  Ministry  of  the  State  President.  The D P S M  d u l y  de r ives  i t s  
s t a t u t o r y  responsibilities from the Public Service Act7 and as such, has three primary 
roles (Republic of Botswana, 2003:365): 
 
• “To provide a stable, reliable and impartial public service to the government 
of the day; 
• To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the government by 
providing quality human resource input, so that the government’s 
multifarious services to the public, and its national development activities 
are implemented; 
                                                          
7 This has been amended as of May 1, 2010. 
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• To effectively manage the public service within the framework of good 
service to the public, concern for the welfare of employees, adherence to the 
Public Service Act and attainment of the national social economic 
development objectives.” 
 
3.2 Public Sector Reform in Botswana 
In the context of sub-Saharan African countries, Botswana is considered by various accounts, 
as an exception (Harvey and Lewis, 1990; Adamolekun and Morgan, 1999; Taylor, 2002; 
Clover, 2003). Even a superficial analysis of its development trajectory since independence 
reveals  a  state  that  has,  relative  to  other  developing  countries,  effectively  directed 
development and, though largely mineral dependent, has avoided the ‘resource curse’ that has 
blighted many others with mineral resource abundance. Without aiming to provide a deluge 
of ‘rags to riches statistical information’, it is worth providing some key economic indicators 
to underline relative the exceptionality of the country’s post-colonial development 
(Mogalakwe, 2003). 
 
From a negligible inheritance at independence, meagre even by colonial standards, 
Botswana’s has managed to improve its status from a principally agrarian economy among 
the poorest in the world to upper-middle income classification (Harvey and Lewis, 1990; 
Taylor, 2002; Kaunda, 2005). Hope (2002: 2) estimates that Real GDP grew by more than 9 
percent annually between 1975-76 and 1994-98, with the country recording the fastest rate of 
economic growth in the world, at an average rate of 8.2 percent per annum, in the three 
decades after its independence. When expressed at 1993/94 constant prices, the country’s 
GDP per capita (Pula) increased by 70 per cent between 1966 and 1975/76, from 1,682 to 
2,861.9. In the decade between 1975/76 and 1985/86, GDP per capita grew by a further 80 
per cent to 5,175.0 and 89 per cent in the 15 year period to 2000/01 (Republic of Botswana, 
2003:29). Other indicators of economic progress include the growth of the national budget 
from under $3 million in 1966 to $3 billion by 2004; the growth of exports from $2 million 
to $2 billion within the same period, as well as tenfold growth of formal sector employment to 
just under 300, 000 (Mogae, 2005:2-3). In terms of social indicators, significant advances 
have been recorded in the provision of access to basic services, including clean water 
provision, primary and secondary school enrolments, adult literacy rates and social safety nets 
(Republic of Botswana, 1991; Clover, 2003).  
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Various authors have explored the critical factors behind Botswana’s noteworthy socio- 
economic performance since independence and their exhaustive treatment would warrant a 
great deal more space than is available. Although the country’s natural resource wealth, 
derived in the main from diamond mining, is a commonly cited source, it alone has limited 
explanatory power. Other conjectures have pointed to the early development of good policies, 
such as the multi-year National Development Plans; the pragmatic leadership of the early 
political and bureaucratic elites, evidenced, for example, by the skilful and successful 
negotiations of higher revenues and shareholding with the Southern African Customs Union 
and the De Beers Corporation in 1969 and 1975, respectively; and the considerable extent of 
ethnic homogeneity in the country’s demographics (Harvey and Lewis, 1990; Good, 1992; 
Tsie, 1996; Taylor, 2002; Leith, 2005). Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) also 
highlight pre-colonial forms of political organization that, largely undisturbed by colonial 
rule, have informed the political institutional arrangements for which the country has been 
lauded. This is a sentiment echoed by Harvey and Lewis (1990), who include a long tradition 
of popular participation, demonstrated through the traditional Kgotla system, as among the 
foundations for the sound policies adopted and pursued by the Botswana government. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, beneath the veneer of Botswana’s vaunted exceptionalism 
were several shortcomings that tempted reassessments of its uniqueness from some observers 
(Good, 1992). Despite the existence of administrative reforms intended to optimise 
institutional capacity and engender effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of services, 
including the Organization and Methods and Job Evaluation programmes, significant 
challenges persisted. As the primary instrument in the execution of its policies, the efficient 
management of the public service has long preoccupied public policy discourse in Botswana. 
Concerns about its effectiveness and efficiency were not only raised, as would be expected, 
by the recipients of public goods and services, but also by high-level office bearers. The 
frequent reference to and prioritisation of public sector efficiency in successive official 
publications such as National Development Plans, Budget Speeches and State of the Nation 
Addresses are instructive in this regard (Hope, 2002; Kaunda, 2005). Some of the more 
searing indictments of Botswana’s public service included charges of: 
 
 
•  Perceptions of insensitivity towards citizens, the lack of accountability and 
recourse; 
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•  Lack of effective planning and management at ministerial and 
departmental levels, resulting in non-completion of projects and budget 
overruns; 
•  The  creation  of  unnecessary  posts  in  ministries  and  departments 
because  of ineffective human resource management (Dzimbiri, 2008). 
 
Central to enhancing public sector performance was labour productivity, which was by all 
accounts regarded as low. Although Hope (2002) partly attributes this to the difficulty of 
evaluating production in the public sector, he suggests that Botswana had a productivity 
dilemma: a failure to transition from a producer to a customer-oriented conception of 
productivity. That is, one that linked productivity to quality as defined by the customers of 
government agencies, rather than as merely a “mechanistic process of converting inputs into 
outputs” (Hope, 2002:25). There is a sense that personnel management in Botswana’s public 
sector was equally ineffective and inefficient, with staff reduced to routine operations with 
limited task autonomy. This, unsurprisingly, was borne out in problems such as “absenteeism, 
lateness at work, poor public relations and outright failure to implement Government policies 
and programs” (Republic of Botswana, 1997a:454). 
 
Compounding the problems of service delivery were shortages in skilled personnel in high- 
level areas, as consequence of the government’s inability to attract and retain critical skills. 
Hope (1995) attributes this to economic progress, which created avenues that were more 
lucrative for skilled Batswana in non-governmental sectors and the declining prestige of 
public sector employment. The relatively large complement of expatriate personnel holding 
permanent, pensionable and often senior positions in the public sector after two decades of 
independence was popularly attributed to government lethargy in developing an indigenous 
work force for the public service (Hope, 1995). 
 
The size and scope of Botswana’s public sector were also identified as obstacles to its 
effectiveness and efficiency. The dearth of physical and social infrastructure at independence 
left the government with little choice but to greatly extend its intervention in socio-economic 
development. The consequence of this is that 
 
“over time, government provision of goods and services has created high barriers to entry for the private 
sector and has become part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Furthermore, lack of focus has 
over-extended government implementation capacity and undermined quality in basic public services such 
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as health and education” (Nordås and Gergis, 2000:9). 
 
The implication from the foregoing is that the extension of the bureaucracy into social and 
economic activities such as refuse collection, building and maintenance services, publishing 
and  financial  institutions  -  and  often  free  or  at  subsidized  prices  or  under  monopoly 
conditions - crowded-out private enterprises that may have provided the goods and services 
more effectively and efficiently (Republic of Botswana, 1991). This had particularly adverse 
effects for the achievement of other policy targets, such as attracting foreign investment, 
international competitiveness and sustainable economic diversification away from the 
dominant minerals sector. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Report on Botswana 
(2005: 8),  attributes  the  failure  of  the  country’s  efforts  to  establish  some  manufacturing 
capacity, notably the brief rise and collapse of its motor vehicle assembly plant in part, to 
‘excessive bureaucracy’. 
 
The above makes apparent that prior to its second wave of reforms, a principal challenge for 
Botswana’s public service was that of achieving efficiency in its delivery of services. In 
response to the issues outlined above, and also to the transformations occurring within and 
beyond the country’s borders, in collaboration with a wide range of stakeholders government 
convened  a  Presidential  Task  Group  in  1997  to  formulate  an  overarching  development 
strategy for the country to “guide national development planning [and] take stock of the 
achievements on national aspirations set at the time of independence” (Nkhwa, 2003:3). The 
resultant strategy document, titled Vision 2016 – a Long Term Vision for Botswana: towards 
Prosperity for All delineates a vision of Botswana of Botswana’s socio-economic wellbeing 
in the year 2016 – the date’s significance being that it will mark the country’s 50th  year of 
independence. The Vision 2016 document identifies seven ‘pillars’ or objectives, which are to 
be achieved by the set date. These are that Botswana will be: 
 
• An Educated, Informed Nation 
 
• A prosperous, productive and innovative nation 
 
• A compassionate, just and caring nation 
 
• A safe and secure nation 
 
• An open, democratic and accountable nation 
 
• A moral and tolerant nation 
 
• A united nation (Republic of Botswana, 1997b:1). 
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A noteworthy feature of the Vision 2016 strategy is that identifies the reform of the public 
service as “central to the realization of the vision” (Republic of Botswana, 1997b:30). As the 
guiding frameworks for service delivery, the National Development Plans were to be aligned 
to the strategic objectives outlined in the Vision. 
 
A recurrent feature of Botswana’s post-independence development has been concerted 
attempts by the country’s government to improve its public service through the incremental 
application of institutional and administrative reforms. Some useful conclusions about these 
early reforms may be drawn. Firstly, an important observation to be made is that owing to the 
factors identified above, including significant mineral resource revenues and development 
oriented policy choices, Botswana was able to avoid the kind of reliance on foreign aid that 
culminated in the policy-based lending arrangements to which many developing countries 
were tied in the 1980s. Implied by the above is that Botswana has had considerable autonomy 
in setting the design and pace of its reforms to identified policy issues, with the influence of 
external actors being secondary (Simwanza and Samaratunge, 2010). That it has also been a 
de facto one-party state since this period has undoubtedly been a facilitative factor in its 
reform endeavours. 
 
Another point worth underlining is that previous interventions were considered to be ad-hoc 
and fragmented in nature: dealing with specific aspects and problems of departments and 
ministries (Republic of Botswana, 1999). Corkery et al. (1998:99) support this point in their 
observation that “in the past, while the target and focus for reforms have been specified, 
programmes have been allowed to be misdirected and delayed.” As a result, it is worth noting 
that although useful to some extent, these reforms were popularly perceived as ineffective in 
addressing systemic problems such as low productivity and poor service delivery. At this 
point, it is worth looking in closer detail at the backgrounds to Botswana’s recent public 
sector reform initiatives. 
 
3.2.1 Performance Management 
In view of the popular disaffection with the public service and the concordant findings of an 
evaluation of public service performance and previous reforms by the consultancy group, 
Academy for Educational Development (AED), the government of Botswana identified the 
need for a “new way of carrying out public service and Government business” (Republic of 
Botswana, 1999:4). Based on the recommendations of the AED report, the Performance 
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Management System (PMS) was chosen as an appropriate strategy to meet the residual 
challenges facing the public service. Following an initial pilot phase involving two ministries 
(The Ministries of Labour and Home Affairs), full installation of the PMS in the public 
service began in 1999 and was completed in 2004. 
 
Published in July 1999, the PMS Philosophy Document signaled the Botswana government’s 
intention to break with previous methods of administration and institute a new ‘holistic’ and 
integrative management framework for the public service. The document provided, as a first 
step in motivating for the new vision of the public service, an account of government’s 
interventions to date. Despite some admirable successes a crucial limitation of earlier 
initiatives like the Work Improvement Teams (WITS) and the Organization and Methods 
(O&M) programme was weak planning at organizational and departmental levels.  In view of 
this and other challenges facing the public service at the time, including inefficiency and 
perceptions   of   insensitivity   to   citizens,   PMS   along   with   other   reforms   such   as 
decentralization and the computerization of personnel management systems (CPMS) were 
deemed appropriate means to the desired ends of improved productivity, efficiency and 
quality in service delivery provision to the public (Republic of Botswana, 1999). PMS has 
sought to deliver on this need by engendering performance planning into the work culture of 
public service organizations and their officers. In particular, it envisages a public service that 
“delivers on set and agreed plans, improves and sustains productivity at all levels, and 
inculcates a culture of performance, accountability and focus on results or outputs” (Republic 
of Botswana, 1999:5). 
 
Among the stated implications for the PMS, it was expected to subsume previous initiatives 
like restructuring, reengineering and the Work Improvement Teams Strategy (WITS) into a 
coherent and holistic framework for performance improvement in the public service. Taking 
the WITS as an example, its role as a problem solving mechanism would provide an avenue 
for pre-empting any problems arising from PMS inspired-strategic goals and would be 
consistent with PMS’s emphasis on a consultative and collective approach at all levels of the 
organization towards the achievement of objectives (Republic of Botswana, 1999).  To 
advance performance targets, PMS would mandate the provision of clearly defined objectives 
and standards for individuals, teams, departments and ministries for alignment with broader 
public service performance expectations (Republic of Botswana, 1999). 
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According to the PMS Philosophy (1999), the initiative would also make provisions for 
various g r o u p s  i nc luding  the  ‘ cus tomer ’  (citizens), min is t r i e s  and  d e p a r t m e n t s , 
pub l i c  servants employees and the country. The document highlights as among the various 
benefits to be gained by customers from its implementation: responsive services, regular 
feedback and interactions with ministries and value for money (Republic of Botswana, 1999). 
Public servants were to gain, among other things, objective performance appraisals guided by 
quarterly performance reviews.  Central to this would be a performance-based rewards 
systems (PBRS) which would align performance and rewards to encourage continuous 
performance improvement. Other support tools for Botswana’s performance management 
architecture would include Balanced Score Card (BSC) and employment contracts for senior 
civil servants. Ministries and departments, for their part, would be expected to develop vision 
and mission statements “with achievable goals and objectives, key performance and results 
areas, set standards and objective strategic measures” (Republic of Botswana, 1999:8) with 
managers responsible for assuming leadership for the change process. 
 
3.2.2 Privatization 
At the time of independence in 1966, the government of Botswana was compelled to take up 
a prominent role in the development of the country because of the absence of public 
infrastructure. Due chiefly to colonial neglect, itself a consequence of political uncertainties 
over the future of the then protectorate, poor climatic conditions and an apparent deficiency 
of natural resources, the country had no industrial base. The private sector was equally 
undeveloped, with formal economic activities limited to pastoral farming, an abattoir, a 
tannery and a soap factory (Jefferis, 1998; Kaunda, 1999). Faced with this situation, the 
government assumed responsibility for the provision of basic services; a process achieved in 
three main ways: 
 
• “The establishment of public enterprises or parastatals by Acts of Parliament 
• Indirectly through Government’s investment arm, the Botswana 
Development Corporation (BDC) 
• Through the creation of departments that performed tasks, which in 
most developed economies,  would  be  predominantly  performed  by  the  
private  sector,  such  as  the Central Transport Organization” (Republic of 
Botswana, 2000:4). 
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The public enterprises established by the state after independence can be classified into four 
broad categories: utilities, transport, agriculture and financial institutions (Jefferis, 1998). 
Included among these are the Botswana Power Corporation (BPC), Botswana Housing 
Corporation (BHC), Botswana Development Corporation (BDC), Botswana Agricultural 
Marketing Board (BAMB) and the national airline, Air Botswana. 
 
An assessment of the number of public enterprises and the breadth of their activities in 
Botswana’s economy since independence reveals them to be limited, compared to their sizes 
and roles in other African states. Taking their contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
as a measure, in 1991 Botswana’s public enterprises accounted for around 6% of GDP 
compared to an average of 17% in other African countries (Jefferis, 1998; Leith, 2003). One 
explanation for this could be the policy of widespread nationalization of private enterprises 
pursued by many developing countries shortly after their independence. Botswana, as alluded 
to above, did not have a private sector and thus no basis on which to launch such a policy. 
The government also avoided direct participation in key sectors such as manufacturing, as 
done elsewhere on the continent, opting rather to facilitate the growth of the industry through 
the creation of development banks, “public utilities, transport enterprises and an agricultural 
marketing board” (Republic of Botswana, 2000:4). 
 
Underpinning the above is an important distinction between Botswana and many developing 
(African) countries. While several developed countries were inclined to socialist-oriented 
development strategies at independence, Botswana, comparatively late to independence and 
perhaps aware of the problems experienced by its forerunners, pursued a more pragmatic and 
ideologically neutral course that actively encouraged private sector development (Edge and 
Lekorwe, 1999). The prominent role of the BDC in economic development is testament to 
this. Founded in 1971 as a venture capital company, the mandate of the organization has been 
to  foster  greater  private  sector  and  citizen  participation  in  the  economy  by  providing 
assistance for the establishment and development of commercially viable businesses, 
principally in non-mining sectors such as agriculture and industry (Kaunda,1999; BDC, 
2011). Upon their maturation and success, the organization would then divest from ventures 
“with   the   aim   of   raising   capital   for   future   investment,   encouraging   competition, 
diversification and citizen participation in private business” (Kaunda, 2004). 
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3.2.3 Anti-Corruption Reforms 
A reputation for good governance notwithstanding, Botswana has not been immune to 
bureaucratic corruption. Though not endemic in its proportions, several high profile incidents 
in the early 1990s brought to surface what appeared to be a burgeoning culture of public 
mismanagement a n d  m a l f e a s a n c e .  Among t h e  v a r i o u s  c a s e s  t h a t  
a c h i e v e d  p u b l i c i t y  (prompting Presidential Commissions of Inquiry) and 
underscored the gravity of the problem included: tender irregularities in the supply of 
teaching materials to primary schools, illicit land sales in peri-urban villages near Gaborone, 
gross mismanagement and fraud at the Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC) and the near-
bankruptcy of the National Development Bank from government micro-management and 
unserviced loans (Good, 1994; Hope, 2002). A worrying trend was that prominent in most 
of those cases was the complicity of political and bureaucratic elites. 
 
To stem what appeared to be a tide of corruption in the early 1990s the government 
established a permanent body to deal with issues of corruption and economic crime, which 
had hitherto been the responsibility of the Botswana Police Service through the Penal Code. 
Modelled after Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), the 
Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was created in 1994 and derives its 
legislative authority principally from the Corruption and Economic Crime Act No. 13 of 1994 
(Oluwu, 1999; Katlholo, 2004). 
 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined the constitutional and administrative frameworks within which 
Botswana’s public sector operates. More importantly, it has given the motives for the key 
second generation public sector reforms in the country, namely PMS, privatization and the 
anti-corruption institution, the DCEC. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Findings and Analysis 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the governance structure of Botswana and provided the 
background, including the rationale, for the second phase of public sector transformations in 
the country. This chapter will examine in closer detail the implementation of three public 
sector r e f o r m s  u n d e r t a k e n  i n  B o t s w a n a , b e i n g  P M S , p r i v a t i z a t i o n  a n d  a n t i -
corruption reforms. In addition to this, it will present the findings of the study with regard to 
the effects these initiatives have had on the specific challenges that they have sought to 
address. 
 
Overview 
According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2003), one of the challenges confronting comprehensive 
evaluation of public management reforms, to which even some of the more advanced 
reformers like New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom have succumbed, is the dearth 
of key data. Common to these and other countries is that “many – probably most – major 
reform programmes have been announced and implemented without any plans for systematic 
and independent evaluation in place” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2003:15). Although performance 
management as practiced in Botswana has undergone various reviews and evaluations both 
during and subsequent to its installation in 2004, a crucial limitation of these has been the 
absence of quantitative baseline data, for both individual and organizational performance, 
from which to draw ‘before and after’ comparisons of interventions. The government has 
relied instead upon a combination of anecdotal information and a situational analysis 
introduced two years into the implementation of the programme. The unfortunate implication 
of this lack of reliable data for the evaluation of performance management in Botswana’s 
public service is a lack of demonstrable certainty of the effects of intervention. 
 
From the various evaluations of performance management in Botswana’s public sector the 
results of three of the most recent assessments commissioned by the Government, the 
Botswana PMS Evaluation Report of 2005 (from here, the Evaluation Report), the Customer 
Satisfaction Survey for the Public Service of 2005 and to a lesser extent and the Public Sector 
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Reform Unit’s Customer Satisfaction and Staff Perception Survey of 2008, will primarily be 
relied upon for assistance in assessing the extent to which the implementation of the PMS in 
Botswana has made an appreciable difference to public service quality and delivery in the 
country. A point worth noting about the Evaluation Report and the surveys is that they were 
conducted a few years after the introduction of the programme. The implication is that 
although they present interesting findings, particularly on the benefits that performance 
management has brought to Botswana’s public service, they represent early and therefore, 
largely inconclusive insight for what was intended to be an evolving and long-term process. 
 
4.1 Performance Management Systems 
4.1.1 Implementation framework for PMS 
Central to the implementation of performance management in Botswana’s public service has 
been the reliance on certain institutional structures and tools to facilitate its management. 
Included among these are the performance improvement committee (PIC Force), ministerial 
performance improvement committee (MPIC), Directorate of Public Service Management 
(DPSM) and the Botswana National Productivity Centre (BNPC). At the apex of the 
institutional framework to administer the PMS is the PIC Force, which comprises all 
Permanent Secretaries (Directors General), Heads of Independent Departments and the Public 
Sector Reform Unit (PSRU). Chaired by the Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP), the 
forum plays a leading role in driving the PMS initiative in Botswana’s public service and 
provides an forum for Permanent Secretaries, who are responsible for creating enabling 
conditions for reform initiatives in their Ministries, to liaise over implementation problems, 
progress and experiences (Republic of Botswana, 2005a; Dzimbiri, 2008). 
 
The MPICs consist of the Permanent Secretaries, Heads of Departments and Performance 
Improvement Coordinators (PICs) of each ministry. Despite operating at the ministerial level, 
the MPIC plays a similar role to the PIC-Force: the management of public service reform 
activities within ministries and departments. Two other salient elements of the institutional 
framework of PMS are the Departmental Performance Improvement Committee (DPIC) and 
Performance Improvement Coordinators (PICs). The former is a subdivision of the MPIC and 
its membership includes department directors and unit or section heads. The role of DPICs is 
to manage the public sector reform process in the departments. PICs are officers appointed 
at D1 level and are responsible for, among other things, the coordination and monitoring of 
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PMS in each ministry, for which quarterly reports and briefings are produced and presented 
to the Permanent Secretary and the Minister (Republic of Botswana, 2005a; Dzimbiri, 2008). 
 
4.1.2 Impact of Performance Management Systems 
Of the benefits to Botswana’s public service derived from the introduction of the PMS, the 
establishment of a culture of planning and strategically driven actions are deemed foremost in 
the Evaluation Report (2005: VI). The report indicates that the planning agenda introduced by 
the PMS has led to increased results orientation and customer service focus in the public 
service because of the use of more disciplined tools for measuring and monitoring 
performance. Some of the critical outputs of the PMS in this regard have been the Ministerial 
and Departmental Strategic Plans, and the performance agreements and performance 
development plans that, at least at a conceptual level, have provided the foundations for 
procedural rationality in the planning for, and monitoring and review of performance in 
Botswana’s public service. Some of the outcomes brought about by the PMS and cited in the 
Evaluation Report include: 
 
• The introduction of a culture of planning and strategically driven actions 
• The emergence of a culture of consultation and team work 
• Recognition  of  the  importance  of  measurement  and  the  performance 
management process 
• Emergence of stakeholder and customer focus 
• Leadership driven transformation (Republic of Botswana, 2005a:VII) 
 
Notwithstanding t h e  p o s i t i v e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  h i g h l i g h t e d  a b o v e , t h e r e  
a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  obstacles to the implementation of the PMS in Botswana’s public 
service. At the level of implementation, considerable difficulties have been encountered in 
synchronising ministerial strategic planning to the country’s broader macroeconomic plans, 
namely the National Vision 2016 strategy and the National Development Plan (NDP). The 
Evaluation Report (2005a:15) found that although a clear description of the desired 
destination for the country is provided by the Vision strategy, it fails to gain expression in 
the form of tangible delivery targets and milestones in the macro-economic level plan, NDP 
9. The consequence has been a general disregard for the NDP strategy in Ministerial 
strategic plans and only cursory allusions to the Vision strategy pillars. This tenuous 
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connection between the PMS-driven ministerial strategic plans and Vision 2016 strategy is 
particularly problematic because “the primary rationale and ‘raison d’être’  for the 
implementation of PMS in the public service of Botswana is the realisation of the 
aspirations of the very National Vision” (Republic of Botswana, 2005a:16). 
 
According to the PMS Philosophy (1999), Annual Performance Plans (APPs) were intended 
to provide operational guidelines for ministries and departments to assist in the delivery of 
the broader strategic aims of the National Vision. In addition, the Philosophy (1999:5) 
envisaged that Ministries would “also be able to objectively justify their budget and funding 
requirements mostly emanating from the Annual Performance Plans.” This implies that 
outputs identified in the APPs were meant to precede the budgeting process. The Evaluation 
Report’s findings are that rather than APP outcomes determining the budgeting process in a 
coherent ‘PMS driven budgeting system’, budgeting remains largely independent of 
ministerial operational plans (2005a:20). This indicates that although there has been a 
commitment to engendering a performance ethos into Botswana’s public sector, as evidenced 
by operational planning, for example, the progression from inputs to outcomes orientation has 
remained a challenge. 
 
Individual performance monitoring and review, and associated recording tools, such as the 
indicators and benchmarks with which to measure them, form central components of the PMS 
Philosophy (1999). Ministries and Departments have encountered difficulties in establishing 
quantifiable performance measures at senior and junior levels of employment. At senior 
levels, for example, there s a tendency among Permanent Secretaries of opting for projects 
and activities as performance measures in their performance agreements because of their 
relative  ease  of  identification  and  quantification,  rather  than  outcomes  (Republic  of 
Botswana, 2005a:29). Performance measurement difficulties have also occurred at junior 
levels, being especially pronounced for industrial level employees, such as clerks and drivers. 
The difficulty of establishing performance indicators for more operational and routine work 
has produced the tendency to evaluate easily measurable activities in their assessments. As 
consequence of this, the veracity of statistics and performance achievements is compromised, 
and renders the achievement of the strategic goals such as better service delivery and 
productivity, among others, misleading (Republic of Botswana, 2005a:30). 
 
The   introduction   of   performance   management   has   also   called   into   question   the 
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appropriateness of the human resource management regime in Botswana’s public service. 
Despite generally positive perceptions of the PMS among public servants, senior officers 
have reported encountering “difficulties in managing and supervising staff because of 
entrenched attitudes, some of which may be derived from traditional values linked to age, 
gender, ethnic affiliation and other cultural components of the work environment” (Republic 
of Botswana, 2005a:50). Combined with emerging challenges such as demographic changes, 
a more educated workforce and the scourge of HIV/Aids, the difficulties outlined present a 
case for the transition towards a better human resource management framework. The state of 
human resources management in the public service, as depicted in the Evaluation Report, is 
one very much in the traditional mode, with emphases on rules and processes and 
characterised by outdated policies and job descriptions. 
 
Compounding the human resource management difficulties outlined above, an impediment to 
the overall effectiveness of the PMS has been the lack of comprehensive training on the 
programme throughout the civil service. Although top level civil servants have undergone 
PMS workshops or seminars, a weakness identified by most officers and noted in the 
Evaluation Report is that their durations have been “too short to meaningfully equip the 
officers to cascade the concepts to their junior officers” (2005a:53). While a significant cause 
of this discrepancy is that most training initiatives have been located in the capital, Gaborone, 
an inevitable implication is that the street-level bureaucrats responsible for managing PMS 
have been distanced from the initiative. This is borne out by the findings of the Public 
Service Customer Satisfaction and Staff Perception Survey of 2008 in which training in PMS 
is identified by most public servants surveyed as an area of high priority and a determinant of 
job satisfaction. This undoubtedly has an impact on the ability of PMS to achieve greater 
application at the interface between public services and the public they serve. 
 
The  application  of  the  PMS  to  Botswana’s public  service  has,  as  in  many  developed 
countries, brought about some unintended consequences. In the country’s judicial system, for 
example,  performance  paradoxes  have  emerged  from  the  use  of  certain  performance 
measures, detracting from the development, maintenance and sustenance of an “efficient and 
effective Judicial System that dispenses justice fairly, impartially and expeditiously” that 
constitutes the primary mission of this branch of government (Republic of Botswana, 
2011:1). In their study of performance management interventions at the magisterial level of 
Botswana’s judiciary, Marobela and Mawere (2011:5315) use the example of a performance 
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target such as that which demands that “magistrates should not have [criminal] cases that are 
older than 2 years that are pending determination,” as being especially culpable for giving 
rise to unintended consequences. According to their findings (2011), the pursuit of this target 
by magistrates has resulted in unnecessary delays not only to deserving criminal cases of 
lesser ages, but also to civil cases. Referring to the latter, Marobela and Mawere (2011:5315) 
suggest that “very few magistrates now find the time to conduct civil trials as their time is 
now consumed by the attempt to achieve the performance target in the criminal cases.” The 
implication for this, among other unintended consequences is that while performance 
evaluations may well reveal that magistrates are efficient at meeting their targets, the PMS as 
applied to Botswana’s magistrates bench neglects other aspects of performance that are not 
included in the measurements, including accountability to stakeholders. 
 
4.2 Privatization 
4.2.1 Institutional Arrangements and Implementation 
An important driver of the privatization policy for Botswana has been the need to enhance the 
role of the private sector in the economy. Although the absence of adequate private sector 
activity was a factor behind the expansion of government into several spheres of the economy 
immediately following independence, by the late 1990’s, the private sector was considered to 
be sufficiently developed and “capable of supplying services both in competition with, and in 
place of, several Government departments” (Republic of Botswana, 2000:2). With the 
additional growth of the financial sector, the embrace of a privatization strategy signalled 
government’s intention to change its role in the economy from a primary provider of goods 
and services to a facilitator and regulator of private sector led economic activity, consistent 
with the shift in the emphasis of macroeconomic policy from state to market orientation 
(Republic of Botswana, 1998; Republic of Botswana, 2005b). This, according to the 
Privatization Policy (2000:3), necessitated a change in relations between the state and the 
private sector: from one of a nurturer to a “Smart Partnership of cooperation and 
complementarity.” Other factors included the needs to limit the size and scope of the public 
sector and to improve the productivity of public enterprises (Wright, 1997; Nordas and 
Gergis, 2000; Republic of Botswana, 2000). 
 
4.2.2 Privatization Policy Development Process 
In preparation for the privatization policy, a Privatization Task Force was convened by the 
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Ministry of Finance and Development Planning in November 1997. Comprising 14 
representatives from public enterprises, academia, the civil service and the private sector, the 
task force embarked on an eight-month countrywide consultation drive to sensitize Batswana 
about the issue of privatization and solicit their input and concerns (Republic of Botswana, 
1998). Consultation visits were also made to countries deemed to have had extensive 
experience of privatization, including Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. Upon review 
and approval by an inter-ministerial committee in 1998, a Draft Privatization Policy was 
submitted  to  the  Economic  Committee  of  Cabinet  for  final  input  and  approved  by  the 
National Assembly on April 5th 2000 (Adams, 2003). 
 
The Privatization Policy for Botswana identifies two main definitions of privatization. The 
‘narrow’ definition refers to the partial or complete transfer of ownership of public entities 
to private hands, or divestiture. A much broader definition, which the document adopts, takes 
privatization to mean the various measures and policies that result in private sector 
participation in economic activities previously carried out by the public sector. The 
objectives of Botswana’s Privatization Policy include (Re ublic of Botswana, 2000:8): 
 
• “Promoting competition, improving efficiency and increasing productivity 
of state owned enterprises; 
•  Increasing direct citizen participation in the ownership of national assets; 
• Accelerating the rate of economic growth by stimulating 
entrepreneurship and investment; 
• Withdrawing from commercial activities which no longer need to be 
undertaken by the public sector; 
• Reducing the size of the public sector; 
• Relieving the financial and administrative burden of Government in 
undertaking and maintaining a constantly expanding network of services 
and investments in infrastructure; 
• Broadening and deepening the capital market.” 
 
4.2.3 Scope of Privatization 
In considering the extent to which the size of the public sector should be reduced, the Draft 
White Paper on a Privatization Policy for Botswana (1998:49) acknowledges that although 
the scope for privatizing its activities is broad, “the government size should not be reduced to 
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the extent of sacrificing important social and economic objectives.” This principle is 
underlined by the choice of a selective, as opposed to mass approach to privatization. The 
latter course, taken by many developing countries under adjustment programmes, an example 
being Zambia, involved the transfer to private hands of several public enterprises as part of a 
comprehensive national economic reform and restructuring programme (Republic of 
Botswana, 1998; Simwanza and Samaratunge, 2010). The selective approach entails the 
privatization  of  select  public  enterprises  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  with  the  objective  of 
learning “by doing things in sequence” (Republic of Botswana, 1998:50). 
 
4.2.4 Modalities of Privatization 
In the context of the broader understanding of privatization assumed by the Government of 
Botswana, different ‘modalities’ of commercial involvement could be considered depending 
upon several factors, including “the objectives of the government; the financial condition and 
performance record of the entity; and the ability to mobilise private sector resources” 
(Republic of Botswana, 2000:8). The various gradations of privatization identified by the 
Policy include commercialization, corporatization, contracting out, management contracts, 
concessions, management and/ or employee buyouts and stock market flotations. 
Commercialization could be considered for government departments considered to provide 
goods and services similar to those produced by the private sector. The contracting out of 
services to the private sector is another privatization reform option to the Botswana 
government. According to the Draft White Paper on Privatization (1998), several parastatals 
and government departments have already had experience of contracting out some of their 
functions, including consulting services, legal service and maintenance services. 
 
4.2.5 Public Enterprise Reforms 
Public enterprise reforms constitute an important element of Botswana’s privatization policy. 
According to the Draft White Paper (1998), among the various issues for public enterprise 
reviews are: the imprecise performance targets for public enterprises and the absence of 
appropriate sanctions; the lack of managerial autonomy over operational decisions such as 
price determinations, executive appointments and remunerations, and; the fact that public 
enterprises are not subject to income tax nor required to pay dividends commensurate with 
the capital invested in them. These aspects of the financial structures of public enterprises, 
along with their debts, and inconsistent rates of return are identified as sources of inefficiency 
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and potentially prohibitive to private investors (Republic of Botswana, 2000). 
 
Financial restructuring is the chosen method for reforming public enterprises and according 
to  the  Policy  entails  a  “reorganization  of  the  assets  and  liabilities  on  the 
enterprise’s balance sheet in a manner that will be consistent with a credible cash flow 
projection” (Republic of Botswana, 2000:15). The aim of restructuring is to improve the 
performance of public enterprises and make those earmarked for privatization attractive to 
potential buyers. It is expected that financial restructuring will help reduce the debt through, 
among other things, debt-equity conversions. Other elements of restructuring include the sale 
of some assets, the injection of new capital and the writing off or writing down of others. 
According to the Policy, irrespective of the form it will eventually assume, privatization will 
not succeed if the accompanying policy, legislative and regulatory frameworks are restrictive. 
The Policy, therefore, also proposes reviews to the legal and regulatory environments within 
which public enterprises function, whether or not they will be privatized. 
 
While noting that the current legal framework appears to be adequate, the Policy  
acknowledges that commercial and business laws will be reviewed for “weaknesses in their 
enabling and regulatory functions so that the appropriate remedial action can be taken” 
(Republic of Botswana, 2000:17). Consistent with the selective approach to privatization 
taken by the Government, the legal steps required to privatize an organization or unit are to 
correspond with its legal form. For example, public enterprises operating as government 
departments will be corporatiz d, while those  already  operating  as  corporations  will  be  
granted  further  legislative  authority  to facilitate their partial or complete transfer to the 
private sector. 
 
The Privatization Policy identifies the need for a Competition Law to outline the powers, 
rights and responsibilities for competitive entities, particularly newly privatized monopolies. 
An important element of the proposed Law would be its provision for an Act that would 
establish the powers and functions of the regulator. Given the lack of capacity for dedicated 
regulators in different monopolistic sectors such as electricity and water provision, the Policy 
envisages that the regulatory functions for the different sectors will be assumed under one 
umbrella or multi-product regulator, whose functions will include (Republic of Botswana, 
1998): 
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• The promotion of competitive market conduct and prevention of misuse 
of monopoly power; 
• The enforcement of licensees’ obligations under the licence and under 
relevant statutes; 
  • Monitoring  quality  of  service  and  prescribing  service  standards  
under  enabling authority under the licence or statute; 
• Acting as a facilitator between consumer groups and, regulated industries 
and relevant government departments. 
 
Pivotal to the public enterprises reform and privatization processes is the need for strong 
institutional capacity to, in the case of the former, undertake effective monitoring of their 
performances, and in the latter, manage with strict adherence to commercial principles, the 
complex contractual arrangements that ensued (Republic of Botswana, 2000). The 
strengthening of the judicial  system,  particularly  to  ensure  efficiency  in  the  resolution  of  
commercial  and industrial disputes, is highlighted as one means of improving institutional 
capacity. 
 
The Privatization Policy also points to the creation by government of an autonomous agency 
to “perform the twin tasks of effective evaluation of the performance of parastatals and 
advice on the commercialization and privatization process” (Republic of Botswana, 
2000:21). Conceived of as an independent agency to be run along commercial lines, the 
Public Enterprise Evaluation and Privatization Agency (PEEPA) would consist of a board of 
government appointed directors, mostly from the private sector and serving on limited term 
contracts. In addition to the oversight role alluded to above, the organization would be 
responsible for, among other things: 
 
• Identification of candidates for privatization or commercialization/ 
corporatization and decide on the appropriate course of action; 
• Preparation of a privatization master plan; 
• Reviewing objectives of existing parastatals and setting objectives for 
entities to be commercialized and/or privatized; 
• Assisting government in setting performance targets for parastatals and 
other public entities; 
• Developing and executing a public education programme. 
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Of the various responsibilities for PEEPA, perhaps the most significant would be the 
development of the Privatization Master Plan, which would provide a detailed privatization 
and commercialization programme. In addition to identifying possible candidates for 
privatization, the plan would outline the criteria to be used. 
 
Following the adoption of the Policy in 2000, PEEPA was established in August 2001 with 
its first task being the development of a “detailed plan of commercialization and privatization 
in consultation with all stakeholders” (Republic of Botswana, 2000:25). Subsequent to a 
major review of the activities and operations of public enterprises, the Master Plan was 
approved by Government in 2005 with the main purpose of providing “a screening of all 
public enterprises for suitability for privatization using the criteria of desirability and 
feasibility and to draw up an action plan for those parastatals and public services which have 
been s e l e c t e d  f o r  e a r l y  p r i v a t i z a t i o n  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n ” ( Republic o f  
B o t s w a n a , 2005b:5). It would only be when the privatization of a public enterprise was 
perceived as being both desirable and feasible therefore, that consideration would be given to 
its partial or complete transfer to the private sector. 
 
The  desirability  criterion,  according  to  the  P r i v a t i z a t i o n  Policy ,  would  be  based  
on  an assessment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of private sector over public 
sector provision of the particular good or service considered (Republic of Botswana, 
2000:10). While desirability is likely to be augmented  by  factors  such  as  the  potential  
for  efficiency  improvements,  access  to international markets and the promotion of 
citizen empowerment, the social, development and strategic importance of the particular 
enterprise are equally important factors. Feasibility refers to the ease with which an enterprise 
can be privatized, as well as the appeal of its activities to prospective investors. These are 
determined by, among others, the state of the legal and regulatory framework, as well the 
growth potential and market position occupied by the enterprise. Some of the factors 
enhancing the feasibility of privatization for an enterprise or activity include its profitability 
and availability of resources for purchase. The necessity of preliminary legislative changes, 
sector reforms or restructuring will, however, reduce the likelihood of privatization. 
 
Based on the criteria of desirability and feasibility, the Privatization Master Plan out l ines  
several parastatals and enterprises that meet both criteria, i.e., are suitable for immediate 
transfer to the private sector. These include the Botswana Telecommunications Corporation 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
62  
(BTC), Air Botswana, the Government Employees’ Motor Vehicle and Residential 
Property Advance Scheme (GEMVAS) and subsidiary companies of various enterprises such 
as the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) and the Botswana Post (BP). Two of these 
enterprises, notably BTC and Air Botswana, are included in the first Privatization Action Plan 
which, expected to run from 2005/06 to 2008/09, sequenced a maximum of two major 
privatization exercises to be undertaken concurrently with the transfer of smaller entities. 
 
4.2.6 Impact of Privatization 
With the exception of the contracting out of municipal services such as road development and 
maintenance, and gardening, cleaning and security services, Botswana’s privatization 
endeavours, particularly the sale of its public enterprises to the private sector, have largely 
failed to bear fruit.  The  failures  to  privatize  Air  Botswana  and  the  BTC  -  the  two 
organizations  identified  in  the Master Plan  as  the first  and  m st  primed  candidates  for 
outright sale - within the 4-year period of the first Action Plan are instructive. More 
significantly, the protracted privatization process of the national airline in particular, has 
exposed several weaknesses in the country’s privatization strategy. 
 
Established in 1980, Air Botswana’s identification as a candidate for privatization predates 
the 2005 Master Plan. Notwithstanding initial preparations for its transfer to private hands, 
such as major financial restructuring in 1994/1995, the Airline has yet to be privatized despite 
interest from prospective investors such as Comair, Air Mauritius, Airlink of South Africa 
and a Russian tycoon (Mmegi, 2008). While a fleeting glance at successive Budget Speeches 
since 2000 indicates initial optimism about the process, by 2008 it was apparent that hope had 
given  way to  skepticism,  particularly  about  the  profitability of  the  enterprise  (Republic  
of Botswana, 2008). Given factors such as consecutive net losses, ageing fleets and the 
inability to retain qualified pilots, government decided to recapitalize the airline, apportioning 
P103.1 million of that year’s budget for the process. In addition to that, a management 
contract arrangement was sought in 2009 and the privatization indefinitely deferred in 2010 
(Republic of Botswana, 2008; 2009a; 2010). 
 
Similarly, the privatization of the BTC has been a protracted process beset with 
implementation problems. As of 2010, neither the BTC nor any other public enterprise had 
been privatized. The sluggish progress of Botswana’s privatization endeavours means that 
that the country has generally been ineffective in reducing the size of its public sector and 
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improving the presence of the private sector in the economy. The 10th National Development 
Plan 10 (2009b:109) indicates a public service establishment annual employment growth 
rate of 2.5 percent over the six years of NDP 9, or 10 135 new posts in that period. Equally, 
the devastating effect of the global economic crisis on the country’s economy, caused in 
large part by a decline in diamond exports, only served to highlight the continued 
significance of the Botswana economy’s dependence on the mining sector. According to 
the 2010 Budget Speech (2010:4), this was reflected in the 4.6 percent contraction in 
real GDP between 2008/9, largely as a result of a mining sector that declined by 31.4 
percent, despite the rest of the economy registering an 11.6 percent growth rate over the same 
period. 
 
There are various possible accounts for the lack of meaningful growth in private sector 
participation in Botswana’s economy. One obvious factor is that the absence of the financial 
pressures that have compelled other countries to undertake privatization render Botswana’s 
efforts, though representing government’s real desire for greater private sector participation 
in the economy, less urgent. Another explanation could be that investors may be dissuaded by 
the country’s stable political and economic environments. Adams (2002) argues that foreign 
direct investment is likely to seek out opportunities in countries with the opposite conditions, 
i.e., lacking strict regulatory mechanisms and taxes, and cites Angola as one such country that 
has seen rapid increases in foreign direct investment in recent times, despite instability in it’s 
political environment. 
 
Another explanation may be found in examining the country’s administrative machinery. 
According to Conteh (2008:549), although useful in ensuring the effective management of 
the country’s macro economy since independence, Botswana’s administrative system “suffers 
from some of the pathologies of a highly centralised and overly hierarchical bureaucracy… 
[and]... proves ill-equipped to deal with the dynamic complexities of economic diversification 
through partnership with private actors”. Institutional rigidity, particularly between ministries 
and their field agencies, can be said to be hindering Botswana’s attempts to strengthen the 
role of its private sector by restraining agency autonomy and flexibility. 
 
The overbearing influence of certain central ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and 
Development  Planning  (MFDP)  and  the  Ministry  of  Trade  and  Industry  (MTI)  on  the 
activities of their field agencies have served to undermine the legitimacy of the latter, as well 
as Government’s engagement of the private sector (Conteh, 2006). The preoccupation of 
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senior bureaucrats with ensuring the adherence of field agencies to the rules and procedures 
issued by head office has served to direct agency responsiveness towards servicing the 
requirements of the parent ministry, rather than seeking out private partners to engage 
(Conteh, 2006). This is a sentiment echoed by Kaunda (2004:2), who attributes the repeated 
failures to privatize the national airline to the “centralising tendencies inherent in 
government”.  Although c e r t a i n  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , s u c h  a s  n a t i o n a l  
p r e s t i g e , h a v e  o f t e n  proved to be obstacles in the privatization of certain state 
enterprises such as the national airline, the fact that government has long earmarked it for 
privatization renders such explanations weak in the case of Botswana. Other possible 
accounts for the slow pace of private sector growth through privatization in Botswana include 
the absence of strong motivating factors such as severe financial crises and t h e  
r e l a t i v e l y  w e a k  a d h e r e n c e  among the ruling party t o  predominant ideologies 
such as neo-liberalism, which certainly lent urgency to leading reformers. 
 
While a cursory glance at Botswana’s privatization policy reveals some likeness to 
international best practice, an accurate account of the impact of the policy is that it has 
largely been rhetorical. As a strategy for economic diversification, the policy is hampered by 
the highly bureaucratic and centralized nature of the country’s administration. It is these 
‘pathologies’ that may require addressing, pri r to any sale of state owned enterprises. 
 
4.3 Anti-Corruption Reforms 
4.3.1 The Directorate on Crime and Economic Corruption: Role and Structure 
The Directorate on Crime and Economic Corruption is the Botswana government’s principal 
anti-corruption agency.  Although  it  falls  within  the  ambit  of  the  Ministry  of  the  State 
President, the Directorate is regarded as an operationally independent department. At its head 
is a Director who, according to the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (1994) is appointed 
by the President and to whom the Director is mandated to submit an annual report on the 
Directorate’s activities. The Director is assisted by a Deputy Director and five Assistant 
Directors who oversee the organization’s operational branches. From an initial staff 
complement of 49 and operating only from Gaborone, in 1994, by 2008 DCEC staff had 
grown to over 200 and the organization had expanded to Francistown, the country’s second 
city, to counter the growing number of reports emanating from the north of Botswana 
(Katlholo, 2004; Matlhare, 2006). 
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4.3.2 Investigation 
The functions of the Directorate can broadly be classified into the three strategies of 
investigation, prevention and public education. According to the Corruption and Economic 
Crime Act (1994), the investigative mandate of the DCEC includes: 
 
• to receive and investigate any complaints alleging corruption in any public 
body; 
• to investigate any alleged or suspected offences under this Act, or any other 
offence disclosed during such an investigation; 
• to investigate any alleged or suspected contravention of any of the provisions 
of the fiscal and revenue laws of the country; 
• to investigate any conduct of any person, which in the opinion of the 
Director, may be connected with or conducive to corruption; 
• to assist any law enforcement agency of the Government in the investigation 
of offences involving dishonesty or cheating of the public revenue 
 
To achieve these objectives, the investigations branch of the Directorate is divided into three 
units: intelligence, prosecution and anti-money laundering. The role of the intelligence unit is 
to receive information and reports on which investigations on corruption and economic crime 
are to be based. The Directorate maintains an  ‘open door policy’  approach and  solicits 
information from various sources including the general public, media and government 
departments with some of the principal modes of reporting including telephone, e-mail, fax 
and the Directorate’s toll free number. Subsequent to this, the reports are subject to various 
processes, including factual verification, review and classification and allocations by an 
internal b o a r d .  Reports  are  allocated  according  to  their  merit  and  relevance  to  the 
Directorate, with those deemed worthy of prosecution referred to the Attorney General for 
approval. Upon authorization, the prosecutions unit would then prepare a charge sheet to be 
taken to a magistrate, prosecute the cases in-house, or return the dockets for further 
investigation. 
 
The anti-money laundering unit of the DCEC was established as a result of the 2000 
amendment to the Proceeds of Serious Crimes Act of 1990, which empowered the Directorate 
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to investigate money-laundering offences. An irony of Botswana’s celebrated economic 
growth in much of its post independence years and the subsequent conditions it has fostered 
to court foreign investment and diversify its economy, such as lowering restrictions on doing 
business, has been that it has rendered itself more susceptible to organized crime, and money 
laundering in particular. According to Madzima (2009), the liberal finance and company 
regulatory frameworks that have enabled, among other things, the formation or registration of 
companies without legal imperatives to vet the owners have served to facilitate questionable 
financial transactions. 
 
4.3.3 Corruption Prevention 
Corruption prevents constitutes another branch of the DCEC strategy to combat corruption 
and economic crime. The statutory provisions of this branch, as mandated in subsection 6 f, g 
and h of the Act (1994), include: 
 
• to examine the practices and procedures of public bodies in order to 
facilitate the discovery of corrupt practices and to secure the revision of 
methods of work or procedures which, in the opinion of the Director, may 
be conducive to corrupt practices; 
• to instruct, advise and assist any person, on the latter's request, on ways in 
which corrupt practices may be eliminated by such person; 
• to advise heads of public bodies of changes in practices or procedures 
compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of such public bodies 
which the Director thinks necessary to reduce the likelihood of the 
occurrence of corrupt practices 
 
A reading of the foregoing functions indicates that the primary role of this division is to 
streamline the management systems of public organizations and private persons, if requested, 
to minimise opportunities for corruption. Assignment studies are the primary means by which 
the division discharges its functions. A study typically entails first, an examination of the 
context within which the organization operates, including case files, legislation, policy 
documents and the organization’s structure. This is followed by a firsthand inspection of the 
organization’s management processes, with its information systems, decision-making 
processes and quality of supervision scrutinized for their susceptibility for fraud and 
corruption. The final stage of the study involves recommendations to senior management, of 
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possible revisions to the organization’s management systems. Other prevention initiatives 
undertaken by the division include presentations, publications and workshops (Oluwu, 1999; 
Matlhare, 2006) 
 
 
 
4.3.4 Public Education 
Public education is the final component of the DCEC strategy to counter corruption and 
economic crime. Section 6 of the Act (1994) empowers this division to undertake the twin 
goals of educating the public about and mobilizing support against corruption and economic 
crime. Among the tools used to further these objectives are multi-media, including campaigns 
on radio and television, presentations to public officers, workshops, fairs and exhibitions and 
debates and panel discussions. 
 
4.3.5 Impact of the DCEC 
4.3.5.1 Achievements of the DCEC 
In the years since its establishment in 1994, the DCEC has made significant strides in curbing 
the growth of corruption and economic crime that threatened to tarnish the Botswana’s 
reputation for good governance in the early 1990s. Though not by any means singularly 
attributable to the DCEC, there is not, perhaps, a more significant validation of the 
organization’s contribution than the consistently high rankings the country attains in global 
governance indicators. According to a World Bank Institute report, ‘Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 1996 – 2006’ Botswana ranked first in Africa in the decade in question in areas 
such as accountability, public service delivery and control of corruption. This achievement is 
corroborated b y other  In s t i t u t i o n s ’  governance ind i ces , i n c l ud i ng  Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, at 
the summit of which, Botswana maintained its near permanent position amongst African 
countries in the 2010 surveys. 
 
According to the Medium Term Review of NDP 9 (2006:149), the number of investigations 
launched and the subsequent rates of conviction achieved by the DCEC rose, against the 
backdrop of a levelling in the number of reports made to the organization. While the number 
of investigations launched improved to 30 percent from 27% in the three-year period, a 
conviction rate of 77% percent was recorded in the same period. A possible factor behind this 
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has been the use of a Computerised Case Management System (CMS) in the investigation 
process. The system acts as a database for intelligence on cases of corruption and economic 
crime and replaces the manual storage of case files. One advantage of CMS is that because it 
is electronically based, it provides for input that is more efficient, and offers relatively easy 
access and transfer of case data to officers, supervisors and senior officials in the 
organization.  Additionally, the database allows for statistical analysis of patterns and trends, 
thereby enhancing the effective and efficient management of cases (Republic of Botswana, 
2003; Matlhare, 2006). 
 
Improvements in the effectiveness of public education outreach programmes could also 
account for the improvements made in the quality of investigations. A growth in public 
awareness levels indicates that the majority of the public have developed an understanding of 
what constitutes corruption and economic crime. Lending credence to this are the results of a 
Customer Satisfaction Survey undertaken for the Botswana Public Service. They revealed 
that about two thirds of the respondents expressed their perception of the effectiveness of the 
DCEC’s public education programme as ‘very good’ and just under half (48.9%) rated the 
quality of education programmes on the evils of corruption as ‘good’ (Republic of Botswana: 
2005:106). A favoured target of the education initiatives conducted by the Directorate has 
been the country’s youth; with schools, youth centres and universities often playing host to 
promotional campaigns involving presentations, brochure distributions and anti-corruption 
clubs (Oluwu, 1999; Matlhare, 2006). The use of a mascot, named Rra Boammaruri (Father 
of Truth), has aided awareness among youth of primary school level. According to Katlholo 
(2004:4), the mascot has proved particularly popular, with feedback suggesting that children 
continue to refer to it and that it has “helped them to make moral decisions when faced with 
ethical dilemmas”. 
 
Other advances have been made in areas of corruption prevention. These have included the 
establishment of a Business Ethics Network Chapter in Botswana, as well the development of 
codes of conduct for both the public and private sectors. The targets of the Corrpution 
Prevention Division have been various government departments whose administrative 
procedures have made them vulnerable to corruption. In recent years, the Departments of 
Labour and Immigration have been especially vulnerable to fraudulent activities in areas such 
as the issuing of residence permits, citizenship certificates, as well as passport forgeries. 
Among the measures put in place to prevent the latter form of corruption are a year’s delay 
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before the issuance of a new passport, and a charge of to P1000 for a replacement. In keeping 
with international practice, enhanced security features have also been added to travel 
documents (Gbadamosi, 2006; Republic of Botswana, 2008; Republic of Botswana, 2009b). 
 
4.3.6 Challenges to the DCEC 
Despite the noteworthy achievements cited above, the Directorate faces significant obstacles 
in the delivery of its mandate. It appears, to some extent, to be hamstrung by the limited 
provisions of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA) of 1994 that enables it. An 
example of this is the partiality of the Act towards corruption and economic crime in the 
public sector and the limited attention given to the private sector. This is an especially critical 
shortfall given that the private sphere is often where more sophisticated economic crimes 
such as money laundering and cyber crimes occur, the provisions for which in the context of 
Botswana are hardly comprehensive. According to Madzima (2009), sectors that wittingly or 
unwittingly  give  rise  to  such  crimes  include  property,  construction,  manufacturing  and 
second-hand motor vehicle dealerships. 
 
The flaws of Botswana’s corruption and economic crime legislation extend to the area of 
whistleblowers’ protection. While section 45 of the Act provides for some measure of 
protection for informers, such as the choice of anonymity, this is only in relation to 
proceedings before a court. The obvious limitation is that it leaves whistleblowers vulnerable 
to reprisals, sanctions and possible endangerment from criminals. The importance of more 
comprehensive  legislation  to  protect  informers  is  underlined  by  a  number  of  factors, 
including the rising proportion of anonymous reports and the delays in investigations and in 
some instances closure of cases (Katlholo, 2006). 
 
The absence of legislative provisions for powers of trial over suspected offenders of the Act is 
a source of considerable strain in the relationship between the DCEC and other institutions, 
notably the Attorney General (AG) and the courts. As noted above, the Directorate must seek 
prior authorization from the former before proceeding with prosecution. Despite its relatively 
high conviction rates, existent backlogs in the court system and delays caused by the 
capacity constraints in the AG’s office prevent the rapid resolution of cases, with some 
extending on for several months and even years. The findings of a DCEC Performance Audit 
(2008) indicate that the agency can be apportioned blame for exacerbating delays in the 
resolution of cases. In many instances, cases have had to be sent back to the DCEC from the 
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AG because of factors such as insufficient evidence to support the findings and inadequate 
investigations to test the veracity of statements by the accused.  Other aspects of the 
legislation limitations of the CECA of 1994 include the absence of provisions for the 
independence of the Director and the lack of definitional clarity between corruption and 
maladministration, which has frequently resulted in overlaps in the functions of the DCEC 
and the Office of the Ombudsman (Oluwu, 1999; Gbadamosi, 2006). 
 
Another factor that curtails the effective functioning of the DCEC is capacity constraints and 
in particular the dearth of sufficient specialist skills and expertise in areas such as forensic 
accounting and intelligence analysis. While efforts have been made to equip DCEC officers 
with the necessary competencies through, for example, various training and capacity building 
initiatives with regional and international organizations and the sponsorship of officers to 
tertiary institutions, there remains a critical shortage of capable workers (Republic of 
Botswana, 2003). A plausible explanation for this, according to Malthare (2006) is high staff 
turnover, caused in part by the lack of competitive salaries. As with other organizations and 
sectors, the DCEC has been a victim of national prioritization with sectors like health (driven 
by the HIV/ Aids pandemic in particular) and education receiving the bulk of development 
funds (Katlholo, 2004). 
 
Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings of the implementation of performance management, 
privatization and anti-corruption reform initiatives in Botswana’s public sector. Building on 
the rationale for Botswa a’s second phase of public sector reforms that was presented in the 
previous chapter, it has presented the institutional structures on which these reforms have relied 
upon in the country’s public sector. Furthermore, it has examined their impacts according 
to their stated objectives. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The first objective of this study, as outlined in the introductory chapter, was to identify the 
reasons behind public sector reforms in Botswana. With chapter two having provided a 
broader context of public sector reforms in developed and developing countries, this was 
done and the results presented in the chapter three. The second and third objectives of the 
study were to establish how performance management systems, privatization and anti- 
corruption reforms had been implemented in the public sector; and to evaluate the impact of 
these reforms according to the changes they sought to effect on Botswana’s public service. 
The results of these two objectives were presented in chapter four. 
 
A general observation of the second phase of Botswana’s public sector reforms is that while 
performance management and the DCEC provide room for optimism, by virtue of its inertia, 
the privatization process has provided little cause for optimism so far. Although the DCEC 
could be regarded as having achieved the most success in the pursuit of its objectives, PMS 
has yet to achieve effective implementation. While the three reform initiatives were developed 
internally and not, as in many developing countries, external prescriptions, when viewed from 
a broader perspective they bear some resemblance to reform frameworks seen in more 
developed countries. Performance management systems and to a limited extend privatization 
can be said to carry some elements of New Public Management and its underlying ideas, 
while the establishment of the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime has reflected 
global reform trends towards the ‘good governance’ agenda. 
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
5.1.1 Performance Management Systems 
The Performance Management System was envisaged as the cornerstone of Botswana’s 
recent reform endeavours and a reform through which it was expected that the productivity 
and general performance of the public service would be enhanced. As the findings in the 
previous chapter indicate, the PMS has introduced a culture of planning into the work of 
public service organizations and their employees, as well raising awareness of the importance 
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of the performance measurement, review and evaluation in assessing and assisting progress 
towards strategic objectives. 
 
Despite the relative infancy of PMS, there are numerous pitfalls, some of which were 
highlighted in the previous chapter that must be avoided lest the initiative fails to live up to 
the strong rhetoric of the PMS Philosophy. Training on the PMS, particularly at the lower 
levels of public service employment, is an important step in this regards, because, it is this 
segment which is largely responsible for the day-to-day implementation of government 
policies. The improved effectiveness of the PMS will also depend on greater efforts at 
decentralization of responsibility to Ministries and Departments, commensurate with their 
increased accountability, for planning and budgeting, as well as customization of PMS. 
 
An overview of the performance management system as applied in Botswana’s public service 
indicates some convergence to the ‘managerialism’ strand of New Public Management. 
Managerialism, as explored in the second chapter, comprises beliefs and practices grounded in 
the assumption of management as generic and superior to other methods of organization. With 
its emphasis on the development of strategic objectives, performance measures and targets at 
all levels including ministerial, department and individual employees, the performance 
management system has sought to infuse a sense of procedural rationality to the 
administrative process. This reflects the embrace of administrative values related to the New 
Public Management paradigm, such as output orientation and a culture of justifying both the 
existence of public organizations and their activities.  
 
Of the two variants of managerialism outlined in the literature review, Botswana appears to 
have pursued more of the ‘make’ than the ‘let the managers manage approach.’ This is borne 
out by the use of market-imitative devices such as performance agreements and performance 
and development plans for permanent secretaries and civil servants, respectively. The parallels 
between Botswana’s performance management framework and managerialism are relatively 
tenuous, however. Where, in more advanced reformers, performance management has been 
accompanied by changes to the structural and financial management architecture, this is yet to 
happen in Botswana. This has led to circumstances in which public sector managers have been 
given targets to achieve without the requisite latitude, such as responsibility for hiring and 
firing, to achieve them. 
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5.1.2 Privatization 
Of the three public sector reform initiatives under examination in this study, the privatization 
reform has been the least successful, as it appears to ignore certain challenges within 
Botswana’s economy, such as institutional rigidity and over centralization. In its 
understandable pursuit of a greater role for the private sector in the economy, an important 
task for the government is to re-examine the rationale for privatization, particularly given the 
generally good performances of its public enterprises. Of equal importance in stimulating 
private sector growth is the need to minimize the influence wielded by key economic 
ministries such as the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) on field agencies through, for example, greater 
decentralization of administrative functions. 
 
Privatization, as described in previous chapters has been implemented largely by developing 
countries as a means of raising revenue for the state, reducing it’s involvement in economic 
affairs and more importantly, achieving economic efficiency. While there has been a strong 
undercurrent of rational choice theory assumptions underpinning many of the prescribed 
privatizations in the developing world, the influence of the theory’s core tenets has been 
generally absent in Botswana’s privatization endeavours. Although primary evidence of this 
has been the lack of progress, as envisaged by the privatization policy since its inception, 
other indicators include the definition and scope of privatization adopted in the policy 
document. As identified in the fourth chapter, the privatization policy of Botswana embraces a 
broad definition of privatization and it aims to undertake a selective, case-by-case approach. 
These two policy choices, though seemingly insignificant, are quite instructive. They indicate 
that while the country has committed to increasing the participation of the private sector in 
economic activities previously undertaken by the public sector, it has done so pragmatically 
and without adherence to any ideological prescripts.  
 
5.1.3 Anti-Corruption – The DCEC 
The DCEC is reflective of developments in the public sector reform agendas of developed and 
developing countries. As an institution established to safeguard against the ills of corruption 
and economic crimes, it falls within the broad parameters of what constitutes ‘good 
governance’ reforms.  Despite a long-held distinction of being among the least corrupt 
countries on the African continent, the DCEC has performed reasonably well in 
maintaining Botswana’s admirable position. Through the concerted efforts of the 
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organizations three main divisions – Corruption Prevention, Investigations and Education, the 
DCEC has achieved notable successes, particularly in raising public awareness of corruption. 
There is need for a review of the Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA) of 1994 to be 
strengthened to incorporate more sophisticated crimes such as money laundering and cyber 
crimes and provide greater legislative protection for whistleblowers, in order for the 
organization to improve its performance. With the lack of competitive remuneration offered as 
a prime reason for the DCEC’s high turnover rate, an important task is to ensure that 
compensation is commensurate with the specific skills required. The centrality of important 
skills such as forensic accounting for the organization makes this an urgent priority. 
 
Notwithstanding the privatization initiative, an overview of Botswana’s public sector reforms 
provides cause for cautious optimism. The study has found performance management and the 
DCEC represent steps in the right direction of improving service delivery and eliminating 
corruption in the country. Privatization remains a concern, not least because of the pressing 
issues of reducing the dominance of the state in the economy and diversifying a mineral 
dependent economy. 
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